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Abstract
Motivated by electricity markets, this paper studies the impact of forward contracting in
situations where firms have capacity constraints and heterogeneous production lead times. We
consider a model with two types of firms – leaders and followers – that choose production at
two different times. Followers choose productions in the second stage but can sell forward
contracts in the first stage. Our main result is an explicit characterization of the equilibrium
outcomes. Classic results on forward contracting suggest that it can mitigate market power in
simple settings; however the results in this paper show that the impact of forward markets in this
setting is delicate – forward contracting can enhance or mitigate market power. In particular, our
results show that leader-follower interactions created by heterogeneous production lead times
may cause forward markets to be inefficient, even when there are a large number of followers.
In fact, symmetric equilibria do not necessarily exist due to differences in market power among
the leaders and followers.
1 Introduction
Forward contracting plays a crucial role in a variety of markets, ranging from finance to cloud
computing to commodities, e.g., gas and electricity. Typically, forward contracting is viewed as a
way to increase the efficiency of a marketplace. One way this happens is that forward contracts
allow firms to hedge risks, e.g., risk from price fluctuations. In fact, the study of the efficiency
created through hedging initiated the academic literature on forward contracting, e.g., [38, 27, 32,
2]. However, as the literature grew, other important benefits of forward markets emerged.
One of the most important of these additional benefits is the role that forward contracting plays
in mitigating market power. The seminal paper on this topic is [1], which studies a two-stage
model of forward contracting in a setting where firms have perfect foresight (thus eliminating
the gains possible via hedging risk). This work showed, for the first time, that it is possible to
mitigate market power using forward positions. Intuitively, this happens because the presence of
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forward contracting creates a situation where any individual firm has a strategic incentive to sell
forward, which creates a prisoner’s dilemma where, in equilibrium, all firms produce more than in
the situation without forward contracts. Therefore, the market becomes more competitive.
Following the initial work of [1], the interaction of forward contracting and market power has
been studied in depth. The phenomenon has been investigated empirically in a thread of work
that includes, e.g., [16, 11, 13, 33, 35, 34, 4]. The robustness of the phenomenon to model
assumptions has been studied in depth as well, e.g., [10, 23, 12, 31, 20, 19, 22]. The general
consensus from this literature is that forward contracts often mitigate market power but that cases
where the opposite occurs do exist. At this point, characterizing when forward markets mitigate
and when they enhance market power is still an open and active line of work.
In this paper, we contribute to the study of the interaction between forward contracting and
market power by characterizing the impact of forward contracting in situations where firms have
capacity constraints and heterogeneous production lead times. Heterogeneous lead times create
a leader-follower competition, where firms with long lead times (leaders) must decide production
quantities well in advance and firms with short lead times (followers) can wait to decide production
quantities while still participating in the early market via forward contracts.
Our study is motivated by the operation of electricity markets, where forward markets play a
crucial role, capacity constraints are often binding, and generators have very different lead times.
The study of forward contracting in the context of electricity markets has received considerable
attention, e.g., [17, 39, 25, 15, 22]. This is motivated by the fact that as much as 95% of electricity
is traded through forward contracts, any time from minutes to months ahead of delivery. These
studies focus on whether forward contracting mitigates market power through inducing capacity
investment or reducing network congestion. Market power has been a significant issue in electricity
markets since their deregulation, e.g., [3, 9]. The physical constraints of Kirchoff’s laws and the
non-storable nature of electricity have the potential to create hidden monopolies. Supply is also
further constrained by generators’ ramping limitations. Different generation resources could have
significantly different ramping rates, ranging from as low as 1-7 MW/minute for oil and coal, to 50
MW/min for gas, and to more than 100 MW/min for hydro, e.g., [36, 21, 28].
The same issues described above in the context of electricity markets are also prevalent in other
marketplaces. For example, when new entrants to an industry such as gas or telecommunications
must decide whether to invest in capacities, e.g., see [6, 7]. The capacity expansion process is time
consuming so the new entrants (leaders) must decide in advance the quantities they will supply
to the market. The incumbents (followers) already have capacity and need only decide how much
goods/services to provide. In both industries, forward contracts form a significant portion of the
total output.
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1.1 Contributions of this paper
This paper initiates the study of forward contracting in leader-follower competition. While models
exist, and are well studied independently, for both forward contracting and leader-follower games;
the combination of the two has not been investigated previously.
In particular, this paper introduces a new model for studying the role of forward contracting
in leader-follower Cournot competition. We consider a setting in which there are two types of
firms – leaders and followers – that choose production levels at different stages subject to capacity
constraints. Leaders choose production levels before followers. However, followers are allowed to
sell forward contracts when leaders are choosing their productions.
Our discussions above highlight that, due to the prisoner’s dilemma effect, one may expect
that allowing followers to trade forward contracts would increase their productions and, because
forward contracts mitigate market power. The consequence of this would be that total production
would also increase. In this work, we show that this intuition is not always true, and that the
impact of forward contracting is ambiguous. The market power mitigation property of forward
contracting might, in fact, create opportunities for leaders to exploit followers’ capacity constraints
to manipulate the market.
Specifically, the main results of this paper (Theorems 1 and 2 in Appendix A.4) provide detailed
characterizations of the equilibrium productions with and without forward contracting, which give
a complete picture of when forward contracting mitigates and when it enhances market power.
As observed by [22], capacity constraints may cause profit functions to be non-convex. Therefore,
standard techniques used to show existence and uniqueness no longer apply. Nevertheless, we
provide closed-form expressions of equilibria as a function of the parameters, including the num-
ber of leaders, number of followers, their marginal costs, and the capacity of the followers. Our
explicit characterizations enable us to infer tradeoffs between the parameters as well as obtain
the asymptotic behavior of the system as the numbers of leaders and followers increase. Among
other properties, we show that there is an interval of follower productions just below capacity that
are never symmetric equilibria, and that if there are too few leaders relative to followers, then
there may not exist symmetric equilibria (Lemmas 4 and 6). Moreover, we show that the efficiency
loss due to forward contracting remains strictly positive even with a large number of followers
(Lemma 10).
Our characterizations also show that market equilibria are especially interesting – they may not
exist or may not be unique – at the transition between interior equilibria and full capacity utilization
due to opportunities for market power exploitation. Thus, the result leads to a variety of qualitative
insights about the interaction of forward markets and leader-follower competition.
First and foremost, our results highlight that forward contracting may decrease the efficiency
of the market. The reason is that forward contracting may create opportunities for leaders to ex-
ploit the capacity constraints of the followers. Forward contracts provide incentives for followers
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to produce more. However, if this causes followers to become capacity constrained, then leaders
would be able to profit by withholding their productions disproportionately, and the net effect is
a decrease in total production. Informally, the increased competition due to forward contracting
is offset by the decreased competition faced by the leaders due to followers being capacity con-
strained. Therefore, this is a phenomenon where capacity constraints and forward markets can
create opportunities for market manipulation.
Second, and perhaps more damagingly, our results highlight that symmetric equilibrium may
not exist as a result of market power exploits via capacity constraints. In particular, we show that
symmetric equilibria do not exist precisely when followers are operating close to capacity. Our
analysis shows that, when any follower operates close to capacity, other followers have a strategic
incentive to exploit the fact that this follower is now less flexible by reducing their forward positions.
However, if all firms were to reduce their forward positions simultaneously, the high prices would
create incentives for them to increase their forward positions. Therefore, there is no symmetric
equilibria. This insight is related to the observation by [22] that equilibria may not exist. However,
the argument in [22] was based on showing that profit functions are not convex and no explicit
connection with strategic behavior or the circumstances under which equilibria do not exist were
provided. On the other hand, we provide explicit conditions under which symmetric equilibria do
not exist, and our analyses reveal the strategic interactions that precludes symmetric equilibrium.
1.2 Related literature
Our model, being a combination of the classical forward contracting and leader-follower models,
has not been studied before. However, our study fits into the extensive (separate) literatures on
each of forward contracting and leader-follower competition. In the following, we review the
literature on these and explain how our work contributes to each of them.
Forward markets.
[1] was the first to provide and analyze a model showing that strategic forward contracting mit-
igates market power. Later studies by [10, 23, 12, 31, 20, 19] reaffirmed or invalidated their
findings under other assumptions. As these are not directly relevant to our work, we do not discuss
their details here (see [22] for a survey). However, the general conclusion is that forward markets
do not always mitigate market power in settings more general than that considered by [1].
The domain of electricity markets has seen the most application of the model from [1]. This
may be attributed to the fact that the bulk of trade in electricity are through forward contracts
and market power was a significant issue in wholesale electricity markets after their deregulation.
However, capacity constraints is an important feature in electricity markets, and this feature is
not present in their model. Therefore, there have been numerous extensions in this direction. [17]
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and [39] added network constraints and price caps. However, due to the complexity of the problem,
only numerical solutions were provided. [25, 15] proposed the idea that forward contracts may
increase capacity investment. This idea was then investigated analytically by [22] by adding an
endogenous capacity investment stage. The authors made the interesting finding that forward
contracts may not mitigate market power when capacities are endogenous.
To our knowledge, our work is the first to study the robustness of the findings by [1] in the
classical leader-follower setting with capacity-constrained followers. In addition, our work supple-
ments existing results on the impact of capacity constraints on existence of equilibria, by providing
explicit characterizations under which symmetric equilibria exists and vice versa. This paper builds
on our preliminary work, described in [5], which illustrated that equilibria may not exist in the
specific setting where leaders and followers have equal marginal costs. The work in the current
paper considers a more general setting where leaders and followers could have different marginal
costs, characterizes the asymptotic behavior of the system as the numbers of leaders and followers
increase, and most importantly, characterizes the efficiency loss due to forward contracting.
Leader-follower competition.
The first extension of Stackelberg’s framework to multiple leaders and followers was provided
by [30, 29]. This work also gave conditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Subse-
quently, there has been significant interest in relaxing the assumptions of the model. However,
most studies focus on the technical conditions required for existence and uniqueness, neglecting
to study the underlying strategic behavior. [8] showed that equilibrium is no longer unique if one
removes Sherali’s assumption that identical producers make identical decisions. [6, 37, 7] gener-
alized some of Sherali’s existence and uniqueness results to the setting with uncertainty. There
are also other efforts by [26, 18] that provide conditions for existence using variational inequality
techniques.
We are not aware of any work that adds capacity constraints to Sherali’s model. The closest
related work was by [24] but the authors were investigating price competition (while we focus on
quantity competition). [7] might appear to have included capacity limits in their analyses. However,
the authors used the capacity limits as a technical condition for their proof, since it was defined
by the point where marginal cost exceeds price. Therefore, their capacity constraints are never
binding, and firms in their model do not strategically withhold productions (unlike in our model).
Our work is the first to extend Sherali’s model with capacity constraints on followers while
allowing them to sell forward contracts. Similar to Sherali’s work, we restrict ourselves to symmet-
ric equilibria in the sense that leaders have equal productions and followers have equal forward
positions. We characterize all symmetric equilibria and provide insights into strategic behavior.
Note that [8] showed that equilibrium is no longer unique if Sherali’s symmetry assumptions are
relaxed. However, his findings are technically different from ours. His results are attributed to non-
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smoothness due to the non-negativity constraints on quantities, while our results are attributed to
non-smoothness due to the capacity constraints. Therefore, a symmetric equilibria always exists
in [8] but may not exist in our model.
2 Model
Our goal is to understand whether forward contracting mitigates market power when firms have
capacity constraints and heterogeneous production lead times. To this end, we formulate a model
that combines key elements from the classical forward contracting model proposed in [1] as well
as the classical leader-follower model proposed in [30].
We assume that there are two types of firms – leaders and followers – that choose production
quantities at two different times. Leaders, who have longer lead times than followers, choose
production quantities in the first stage, while followers choose production quantities in the second
stage. However, followers sell forward contracts in the first stage. Thus, we also refer to the first
stage as the forward market and the second stage as the spot market.
2.1 Forward contracting
Our model for forward contracting is based on the classical model from [1]. This model is com-
monly used in many studies of forward markets [23, 12, 17, 20, 19, 39, 22]. In the forward market,
firms sign contracts to deliver a certain quantity of good at a price pf . These contracts are binding
and observable pre-commitments. Then, in the spot market, firms sell the good at a price P (q)
which is a function of the total quantity q of the good sold in both the forward and spot markets.
We assume a linear demand model given by
P (q) = α− βq,
where the constants α, β > 0. This is a common model for demand [1, 22] and implies that buyers’
aggregate utility is quasilinear in money and quadratic in the quantity of the good consumed.
We assume that there is perfect foresight. That is, in the first stage, both leaders and followers
know the demand in the second stage. Equilibrium then requires that the forward and spot prices
are aligned:
pf = P (q).
That is, no arbitrage is possible. This assumption was also used in both the classical forward
contracting model [1] and the classical leader-follower model [30]. An extension to the case of
uncertain demand is definitely relevant and interesting. But our results show that the model with
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certain demand is rich enough to capture interesting strategic interactions between leaders and
followers. The case of uncertain demand is left to future work.
2.2 Production lead times
Our model for leader-follower competition is based on the classical model from [30]. We assume
that there are M leaders and N followers, with marginal costs C and c, respectively, where c ≥ C >
0. We also abuse notation and use M and N to denote the set of leaders and followers, respectively.
The assumption that c ≥ C is motivated by the expectation that there is typically a cost to flexibility,
e.g. in electricity markets more flexible generators typically have higher operating costs than less
flexible generators.
Each leader i ∈ M chooses its production quantity xi in the forward market. Each follower
j ∈ N chooses its production quantity yj in the spot market and also sells a forward contract of
quantity fj in the forward market. We assume that leaders sell forward contracts in the forward
market equal to their committed productions. It is possible to show that allowing leaders to sell
forward contracts that differ from their committed productions does not change the analyses.
We assume that each follower has a production capacity k > 0 but leaders are not capacity
constrained. In practice, followers might only be able to adjust productions within a limited range
around operating points. Thus, a more sophisticated model would have followers choose set points
in the forward market and impose constraints on deviations from those set points. Our model for
followers can be interpreted as them having zero set points and being allowed to ramp productions
to a maximum of k. Similarly, our model for leaders can be interpreted as them choosing their
operating points in the forward market and not being allowed to deviate from them.
2.3 Competitive model
We adopt the following equilibria concept for the market. Let the vectors x = (x1, . . . , xM ), y =
(y1, . . . , yN ), and f = (f1, . . . , fN ) denote the leaders’ productions, followers’ productions, and fol-
lowers’ forward contracts, respectively. We also use the notation f−j = (f1, . . . , fj−1, fj+1, . . . , fN )
to denote the forward contracts of all followers other than i. Similarly, we use the notations
x−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xM ) and y−j = (y1, . . . , yj−1, yj+1, . . . , yN ).
Spot market (followers): We define the spot market equilibrium as follows. Only followers
compete in the spot market. Follower j’s profit from the spot market is:
φ
(s)
j (yj ;y−j) = P
 M∑
i′=1
xi′ +
N∑
j′=1
yj′
 · (yj − fj)− cyj .
Given y−j , follower j chooses a production yj to maximize its profit subject to its capacity con-
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straint. Thus, a Nash equilibrium of the spot market is a vector y such that for all j:
φ
(s)
j (yj ;y−j) ≥ φ(s)j (y¯j ;y−j) , for all y¯j ∈ [0, k] .
Theorem 5 of [14] implies that there always exists a unique spot equilibrium given any leader
productions and follower forward positions (x, f). We denote this unique equilibrium by y (f ,x) =
(y1 (f ,x) , . . . , yN (f ,x)).
Forward market: The forward market equilibrium depends on behaviors of both followers and
leaders. Their profits depend on the outcome of the spot market. In particular, follower j’s profit is
given by:
φj (fj ; f−j ,x) = P
 M∑
i′=1
xi′ +
N∑
j′=1
yj′(f ,x)
 · fj + φ(s)j (y(f ,x))
=
P
 M∑
i′=1
xi′ +
N∑
j′=1
yj′(f ,x)
− c
 · yj(f ,x),
where the second equality follows by substituting for φ(s)j (y(f ,x)). Note that follower j anticipates
the impact of the actions in the forward market on the spot market. Given (f−j ,x), follower j
chooses its forward contract fj to maximize its profit. This is an unconstrained maximization as
followers can take positive or negative positions in the forward market. Next, leader i’s profit is
given by:
ψi (xi;x−i, f) =
P
 M∑
i′=1
xi′ +
N∑
j′=1
yj′(f ,x)
− C
 · xi.
Given (x−i, f), leader i chooses a production xi ∈ R+ to maximize its profit.
Thus, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the forward market is a tuple (f ,x) such that for
all i:
ψi (xi;x−i, f) ≥ ψi (x¯i;x−i, f) , for all x¯i ∈ R+, (1)
and for all j:
φj (fj ; f−j ,x) ≥ φj
(
f¯j ; f−j ,x
)
, for all f¯j ∈ R. (2)
It is this equilibrium that is the focus of this study. To capture the key strategic interactions between
leaders and followers, we focus on equilibria in which leaders have symmetric productions and
followers have symmetric forward positions. This symmetric case already offers many insights.
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3 One Leader and Two Followers
The complete characterization of the model is technical. So, we defer that analysis and discussion
to Section 4 and begin by developing intuition for our results in a special case. Specifically, we start
by considering only M = 1 leader, N = 2 followers, and equal marginal costs C = c. This case,
though simple, is already rich enough to expose the structure of the general results and to highlight
the inefficiencies that arise from forward contracting in leader-follower competition.
The section is organized as follows. First, in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we study the reactions of
the followers to the leader and vice versa, respectively. In particular, we focus on the impact of
followers’ capacity constraints and leader’s commitment power on their responses to the other
producers’ actions. Then, in Section 3.3, we study how they impact the equilibria of the market.
Finally, in Sections 3.4, we study how followers’ forward contracting impact market outcomes.
Throughout this section, we denote the normalized demand by:
α¯ :=
1
β
(α− C).
Recall that α is the maximum price that demand is willing to pay and C is the minimum price that
producers need to receive for them to supply to the market. Therefore, we restrict our analyses to
the case where α¯ ≥ 0.
3.1 Follower reaction
We begin by studying how followers respond when the leader produces a fixed quantity x ∈ R+.
We focus on symmetric responses, that is, those where followers take equal forward positions. Let
F : R+ → P(R) denote the symmetric reaction correspondence of the followers, i.e., for each
f ∈ F (x),
φ1(f ; f, x) ≥ φ1(f¯ ; f, x), ∀f¯ ∈ R;
and φ2(f ; f, x) ≥ φ2(f¯ ; f, x), ∀f¯ ∈ R.
Proposition 2 in the Appendix implies that the followers produce equal quantities y1(f ; f, x) =
y2(f ; f, x). Let Y : R+ → P(R+) denote the production correspondence of the followers, i.e., for
each y ∈ Y (x), there exists f ∈ F (x) such that y1(f ; f, x) = y2(f ; f, x) = y. Applying Propositions 2
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and 3 in the Appendix, the reaction and production correspondences are given by:
F (x) = [−α¯+ x+ 3k,∞), Y (x) = {k}, if x ≤ α¯− 3k,
F (x) = ∅, Y (x) = ∅, if α¯− 3k < x < α¯− 5
5−2√2k,
F (x) =
{
1
5(α¯− x)
}
, Y (x) =
{
2
5(α¯− x)
}
, if α¯− 5
5−2√2k ≤ x ≤ α¯,
F (x) = (−∞,−α¯+ x], Y (x) = {0}, if α¯ ≤ x.
Figure 1 shows the characteristic shapes of F and Y . There are four major segments labelled
(i) – (iv). Note that the follower productions are always k in segment (i) and 0 in segment (iv).
In general, one expects followers’ reactions to decrease as x increases because a higher leader
production decreases the demand in the spot market. This behavior indeed holds in segment (iii),
which is also the behavior in a conventional forward market in the absence of capacity constraints.
However, the capacity constraints lead to complex reactions, as seen in segments (i), (ii), and (iv).
Segments (i) and (iv): x ≤ α¯− 3k or α¯ ≤ x. Multiple equilibria. These are degenerate scenarios
where followers have binding productions, and hence are neutral to a range of different forward
positions, as they all lead to the same production outcomes. The structure of the reaction set is
also intuitive. Consider segment (i), where followers produce zero quantities. If f ′ is a symmetric
reaction, then any f ′′ < f ′ is also a symmetric reaction, since decreasing forward positions create
incentives to decrease productions, and productions cannot drop below zero. Therefore, the reac-
tion sets are left half-lines. A similar argument applies to segment (iv), but in this case, the reaction
sets are right half-lines.
Segment (ii): α¯ − 5
5−2√2k ≤ x ≤ α¯. No equilibrium. This is the scenario where followers’
capacity constraints create incentives for market manipulation which causes symmetric reactions
to disappear. The type of symmetric reactions in segment (iii) are unsustainable here because each
follower has incentive to reduce its forward position. For example, when follower 1 reduces its
forward position, it induces follower 2 to increase its production. However, since follower 2 can
only increase its production up to k, the total production decreases, the market price increases, and
follower 1’s profit increases. By symmetry, follower 2 has incentive to manipulate the market in
a similar manner. Yet, should both followers reduce their forward positions, there will be excess
demand in the market. Therefore, there is no symmetric equilibrium between the followers.
3.2 Leader reaction
Next, we study how the leader responds when both followers take a fixed forward position f ∈ R.
Let X : R→ P(R+) denote the leader’s reaction correspondence, i.e., for each x ∈ X(f),
ψ1 (x; f, f) ≥ ψ1 (x¯; f, f) , ∀x¯ ∈ R+.
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Figure 1: Follower reaction correspondence F and production correspondence Y .
Let Y : R→ P(R+) denote the production correspondence of the followers, i.e., for each y ∈ Y (f),
there exists x ∈ X(f) such that y1(f ; f, x) = y2(f ; f, x) = y. The expressions for X and Y can
be obtained from Propositions 4 and 2 in the Appendix. X and Y takes three distinctive shapes
depending on the value of α¯.
Low demand: 0 ≤ α¯ ≤ 2k. In this case, the reaction and production correspondences are given
by
X(f) = {12 α¯}, Y (f) = {0}, if f ≤ −12 α¯,
X(f) = {α¯+ f}, Y (f) = {0}, if − 12 α¯ ≤ f ≤ −14 α¯,
X(f) = {12 α¯− f}, Y (f) = {16 α¯+ 23f}, if − 14 α¯ ≤ f ≤ 12 α¯,
X(f) = {0}, Y (f) = {13(α¯+ f), if − 12 α¯ ≤ f ≤ 3k − α¯,
X(f) = {0}, Y (f) = {k}, if 3k − α¯ ≤ f.
Figure 2a shows the characteristic shapes of X and Y . There are four major segments labelled (i) –
(iv). The follower supplies 0 in segments (i) and (ii) and supplies k for a subset of segment (iv).
In general, one expects the leader’s production to decrease as f increases, because larger forward
positions lead to larger follower supplies, which decreases the market price. This behavior indeed
holds in segment (iii). However, the capacity constraints and leader’s commitment power lead to
complex reactions in segments (i), (ii), and (iv).
Segment (i) and (iv): f ≤ −12 α¯ or 3k − α¯ ≤ f . Constant production. These are degenerate
scenarios where the leader is insensitive to the followers’ forward positions. When f ≤ −12 α¯, it is
because followers’ always supply zero regardless of their forward positions. When 3k − α¯ ≤ f , it
is because followers supply large quantities, and drive prices down below the level at which it is
profitable for leaders to produce.
Segment (ii): −12 α¯ ≤ f ≤ −14 α¯. Increasing production. In this scenario, the leader uses its
commitment power to drive the followers out of the market. As followers increase their forward
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positions, the leader, instead of decreasing its production (as one typically expects), actually in-
creases its production, as doing so allows it to depress demand below the level at which followers
are willing to supply.
Medium demand: 2k < α¯ < 4
2−√3k. In this scenario, the reaction and production correspon-
dences are given by
X(f) = {12 α¯}, Y (f) = {0}, if f ≤ −12 α¯,
X(f) = {α¯+ f}, Y (f) = {0}, if − 12 α¯ ≤ f ≤ −14 α¯,
X(f) = {−12 α¯}, Y (f) = {16 α¯+ 23f}, if − 14 α¯ ≤ f ≤ −
√
3−1
2 α¯+
√
3k,
X(f) = {12 α¯− f, 12 α¯− k}, Y (f) = {16 α¯+ 23f, k}, if f = −
√
3−1
2 α¯+
√
3k,
X(f) = {12 α¯− k}, Y (f) = {k}, if −
√
3−1
2 α¯+
√
3k < f.
Figure 2b shows the characteristic shapes of X and Y . There are, again, four major segments
labelled (i) – (iv). Segments (i), (ii), and (iii), are similar to that in the low demand case when
0 ≤ α¯ ≤ 2k. Segment (iv), however, is different in that, while the leader produces zero in this
segment when 0 ≤ α¯ ≤ 2k, the leader now produces a strictly positive quantity in this segment.
This is due to the fact that the leader’s profit on each unit is given by
α− β(y1 + y2 + x)− C = β(α¯− y1 − y2 − x),
and hence, when α¯ > 2k, the leader is still able to profit from producing when both followers
produce k. Due to this, the leader also has an incentive to exploit followers’ capacity constraints,
unlike previously when the leader was producing zero. The leader does so by sharply reducing its
production at the end of segment (iii). This induces the followers to increase their supply, but since
followers can only increase their supply up to k, the total market production decreases, the market
price increases, and the leader’s profit increases. Therefore, there is a discontinuity in the leader’s
reaction curve between segments (iii) and (iv).
High demand: 4
2−√3k ≤ α¯. In this scenario, the reaction and production correspondences are
given by
X(f) = {12 α¯}, Y (f) = {0}, if f ≤ −12 α¯,
X(f) = {α¯+ f}, Y (f) = {0}, if − 12 α¯ ≤ f < −12 α¯+
√
(α¯− k)k,
X(f) = {α¯+ f, 12 α¯− k}, Y (f) = {0, k}, if f = −12 α¯+
√
(α¯− k)k,
X(f) = {12 α¯− k}, Y (f) = {k}, if − 12 α¯+
√
(α¯− k)k < f.
Figure 2c shows the characteristic shapes of X and Y . There are now only three segments labelled
(i), (ii), and (iv). These segments are similar to segments (i), (ii), and (iv), respectively, in the
medium demand case where 2k < α¯ < 4
2−√3k. The difference is that, now, the leader decreases its
production sharply once followers begin to supply to the market. As a consequence, the followers’
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Figure 2: Leader reaction correspondence X and follower production correspondence Y .
supply jumps from 0 to k.
3.3 Forward market equilibrium
We now study the equilibria of the forward market. Let Q ⊆ R× R+ denote the set of all symmet-
ric equilibria and Y ⊆ R+ denote the set of all follower productions, i.e., (f, x) ∈ Q if (f, f, x)
is a Nash equilibrium of the forward market, and y ∈ Y if there exists (f, x) ∈ Q such that
y1(f ; f, x) = y2(f ; f, x) = y. From Theorem 1 and Proposition 2, the symmetric equilibria and
follower productions are given by
Q = {(f, x) : f = 18 α¯, x = 38 α¯}, Y = {14 α¯}, if 0 ≤ α¯ ≤ 84−√3k,
Q = ∅, Y = ∅, if 8
4−√3k < α¯ < 4k,
Q = {(f, x) : f ∈ [−12 α¯+ 2k,∞), x = 12 α¯− k}, Y = {k}, if 4k ≤ α¯.
Observe that there are three operating regimes.
Low demand: 0 ≤ α¯ ≤ 8
4−√3k. There is a one symmetric equilibrium. Productions increase
as α¯ increases. This regime is identical to that in the absence of capacity constraints (to see this,
substitute k =∞).
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Medium demand: 8
4−√3k < α¯ < 4k. There is no symmetric equilibrium. This phenomena is due
to leaders and followers withholding productions and forward contracts respectively. As observed
in the separate reaction curves, each individual follower or leader has incentive to exploit the
capacity constraints of the followers by reducing its position in the forward market. But should all
producers do so, there will be excess demand in the market, and hence no symmetric equilibria are
sustainable.
High demand: 4k ≤ α¯. There is a unique equilibrium leader production 12 α¯ − k and infinitely
many equilibrium follower forward positions [−12 α¯+ 2k,∞). The latter is a right half-line because
followers are supplying all their capacity and so are indifferent once forward positions exceed a
certain value. The leader production increases with demand; although the rate of increase of 12 is
slower than in the case when demand is low, where it increased at the rate 38 . This distinction is due
to the leader facing less competition than before when followers were not capacity-constrained.
Note that, unlike with the leader’s reaction curve, there is no apparent phenomenon where the
leader increases its production to drive followers out of the market. This can be attributed to the
fact that the leader and followers have equal marginal costs. In Section 4, we will see that the
leader’s commitment power does cause its equilibrium production to increase with demand, when
we relax the assumption of equal marginal costs.
3.4 Inefficiency of the forward market
To study the efficiency of the forward market, we compare the outcome in our market against that
in a Stackelberg competition, where followers do not sell forward contracts. Therefore, the leader
continues to commit to its production ahead of the followers.
Note that the symmetric Stackelberg equilibria are simply the symmetric reactions of the leader
when followers take neutral forward positions. Therefore, using the notation in Section 3.2, we let
X(0) denote the set of all symmetric Stackelberg equilibria, i.e., for each x ∈ X(0),
ψ1(x; 0, 0) ≥ ψ1(x¯; 0, 0), ∀x¯ ∈ R+,
and we let Y ⊆ R+ denote the set of all follower productions, i.e., y ∈ Y if there exists x ∈ X(0)
such that y1(0; 0, x) = y2(0; 0, x) = y. From Theorem 2, the Stackelberg equilibria are given by
X(0) =
{
1
2 α¯
}
, Y =
{
1
6 α¯
}
, if 0 ≤ α¯ < 2
√
3√
3−1k,
X(0) =
{
1
2 α¯,
1
2 α¯− k
}
, Y =
{
1
3−√3k, k
}
, if α¯ = 2
√
3√
3−1k,
X(0) =
{
1
2 α¯− k
}
, Y = {k} , if 2
√
3√
3−1k < α¯.
Observe that there are two operating regimes. The regime 0 ≤ α¯ < 2
√
3√
3−1k is the regime of
low demand. In this regime, the market has a unique equilibrium and both leader and follower
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productions increase with demand. The regime 2
√
3√
3−1k < α¯ is the regime of high demand. In this
regime, followers produce all their capacity. The leader produces 12 α¯ − k, which is less than its
production 12 α¯ in the low demand regime, because it faces less competition now since followers
have no capacity left to supply.
By comparing the Stackelberg equilibria to the forward market equilibria, we can see that in-
troducing a forward market does not always increase the total market production. In particular,
when 4k ≤ α¯ < 2
√
3√
3−1k, the total production
1
2 α¯ + k with the forward market is less than the total
production 56 α¯ in the Stackelberg market. In this scenario, demand is high and followers produce
almost all their capacity in the Stackelberg market. Having followers trade forward contracts give
them more incentive to produce and they increase their productions to k. However, this has the
side effect of reducing the competition faced by the leader, and giving it an incentive to withhold
its production. The net effect is a decrease in total market production. Since all producers have
equal marginal costs, a decrease in total market production implies a decrease in social welfare.
4 General Structural Results
Building on the analysis in the previous section, we now extend the insights obtained from studying
the case of 1 leader, 2 followers, and equal marginal costs to general numbers of leaders and
followers with marginal costs C and c, respectively, that may be different.
Our main results (Theorems 1 and 2 in Appendix A.4) provide complete characterizations of the
symmetric equilibrium productions with and without the forward market, which give a complete
picture of when forward contracting mitigates and when it enhances market power. Since these
results are technical, we highlight the key properties by characterizing the asymptotic behavior
as the number of producers increases (Lemmas 4 – 10). Among other properties, we show in
Lemmas 4 and 6 that there is an interval of follower productions just below capacity that are never
symmetric equilibria, and that if there are too few leaders relative to followers, then there may not
exist symmetric equilibria. We also show, in Lemma 10, that the efficiency loss as a function of the
number of producers remains strictly positive even with a large number of followers.
This section is organized as follows. First, in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we characterize the structure
of the reactions of the followers to the leaders and vice versa, respectively. Then, in Section 4.3, we
characterize the structure of the equilibria. Finally, in Section 4.4, we characterize the efficiency
loss of followers’ forward contracting.
Throughout this section, we denote by αx and αy the normalized leader and follower demands
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respectively and by4C the normalized marginal cost difference between the leaders and followers:
αx =
1
β
(α− C),
αy =
1
β
(α− c),
4C = 1
β
(c− C).
Note that αy = αx −4C. Since c ≥ C, it suffices to restrict our analyses to the case where αx ≥ 0.
We focus on symmetric equilibria, by which we mean equilibria where leaders have symmetric
productions and followers have symmetric forward positions (which, by Proposition 2, implies that
the latter have symmetric productions).
Unless otherwise stated, the proofs for all the results in this section are provided in Appendix B.
4.1 Follower reaction
Suppose all leaders produce a quantity x ∈ R+ and let F (x) ⊆ R denote the set of all symmetric
follower reactions, i.e., for each f ∈ F (x) and j ∈ N ,
φj(f ; f1, x1) ≥ φj(f¯ ; f1, x1), ∀f¯ ∈ R.
Proposition 3 in Appendix A.2 gives the solution for F (x). Observe that F (x) has a similar shape to
the graph in Figure 1. We focus on the segment where F (x) = ∅ and highlight key properties that
attribute this segment to market manipulation when followers are operating just below capacity.
Lemma 1. The following holds.
1. There exists a unique y¯ < k, such that there exists f ∈ F (x) that satisfies yj(f1, x1) = y if and
only if 0 ≤ y ≤ y¯ or y = k. Moreover,
y¯ =
(
1−O
(
1
N
))
k.
2. There exists a unique
¯
ξ ∈ R+, such that x ≤ 1M (αy −
¯
ξ) if and only if there exists f ∈ F (x)
that satisfies yj(f1, x1) = k, and a unique ξ¯ <
¯
ξ, such that x ≥ 1M (αy − ξ¯) if and only
if there exists f ∈ F (x) that satisfies yj(f1, x1) ≤ y¯. Moreover, F (x) = ∅ for all x ∈(
1
M
(
αy −
¯
ξ
)
, 1M
(
αy − ξ¯
))
and
¯
ξ − ξ¯ =
¯
ξ ·O ( 1N ).
Therefore, there exists an open interval of symmetric leader productions inside which there is no
symmetric follower reaction. Due to this interval, there is a set of symmetric follower productions
just below k that are never equilibria. As N increases, this set shrinks at the rate 1N . In the limit, all
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symmetric follower productions could be equilibria. These asymptotic behaviors are consistent with
the intuition that followers have less ability to manipulate the market as their numbers increase.
4.2 Leader reaction
Suppose all followers take the forward position f ∈ R and let X(f) ⊆ R+ denote the set of all
symmetric leader reactions, i.e., for each x ∈ X(f) and i ∈M ,
ψi(x;x1, f1) ≥ ψi(x¯;x1, f1), ∀x¯ ∈ R+.
Proposition 4 in Appendix A.3 gives the solution for X(f). When αx ≤ Nk, we have η3 ≤ k −
(αx − Nk), and one can check that X(f) has a similar shape to the graph in Figure 2a. When
αx > Nk, then X(f) differs from the graphs in Figures 2b and 2c in that segment (iv) may overlap
with segments (iii) and (ii), i.e., there may be up to two reactions. Here, we focus on segment
(ii) where the leader reaction is strictly increasing, as well as the discontinuous transition between
segment (iv) and segments (ii) or (iii). The following result highlights key properties of segment
(ii).
Lemma 2. There exists unique
¯
f, f¯ ∈ R, such that f ∈ [
¯
f, f¯
]
if and only if 1M (αx −4C + f) ∈ X(f).
Moreover, the following holds:
1. yj
(
f1, 1M (αx −4C + f)1
)
= 0 for all f ∈ [
¯
f, f¯
]
.
2. f¯ −
¯
f = O
(
αx
M
)
.
Therefore, there exists a closed interval
[
¯
f, f¯
]
of symmetric follower productions inside which
there is a graph of strictly increasing leader reactions. Moreover, the followers’ productions are
zero. This is due to leaders using their commitment power to drive the followers out of the market.
As M increases, this interval shrinks at the rate αxM .
The next result highlights key properties of the transition between segment (iii) and (iv).
Lemma 3. Suppose αx > Nk.
1. There exists a unique y¯ < k, such that there exists f ∈ R and x ∈ X(f) that satisfies yj(f1, x1) =
y if and only if 0 ≤ y ≤ y¯ or y = k. Moreover,
y¯ =

(
1−O (αx−NkMN )) k, if αx ≤ Nk (1 + (M+1)√N+1(√N+1−1)2 + (M−1)√N+1√N+1−1 ) ,
0, otherwise.
2. There exists a unique f¯ ∈ R, such that f ≤ f¯ if and only if there exists x ∈ X(f) that satisfies
yj(f1, x1) ≤ y¯, and a unique
¯
f ≤ f¯ , such that f ≥
¯
f if and only if there exists x ∈ X(f)
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that satisfies yj(f1, x1) = k. Moreover, |X(f)| = 2 for all f ∈
[
¯
f, f¯
]
. Furthermore, if αx ≤
Nk
(
1 + (M+1)
√
N+1
(
√
N+1−1)2
)
, then
f¯ −
¯
f = O
(
αx −Nk
M
√
N
)
.
Therefore, there exists an open interval of follower productions (y¯, k) that are never supported
by any leader reaction. This interval is due to leaders manipulating the market when followers are
operating just below capacity. As M , N , αx increases, This interval shrinks at the rate αx−NkMN . In
the limit, all follower productions can be sustained. Moreover, there is also an interval of follower
forward positions
[
¯
f, f¯
]
inside which there are two leader reactions that have different follower
productions (one equal to k and one less than y¯). This interval shrinks at the rate αx−Nk
M
√
N
.
Note that, since the follower production is continuous in f and x, the second claim in Lemma 3
implies that the leader reaction is discontinuous. This was also observed in the case of one leader
and two followers. Also, note that followers’ capacity constraints have different impacts on the
reactions of the followers and that of the leaders. In the case of followers, it led to non-existence
of symmetric reactions. In the case of leaders, there always exists a symmetric reaction but there is
a discontinuity in the reaction correspondence.
4.3 Forward market equilibrium
We now present structural results for the symmetric equilibria of the forward market. Let Q ⊆
R × R+ denote the set of all symmetric equilibria, i.e., for each (f, x) ∈ Q, (f1, x1) is a Nash
equilibrium. Theorem 1 in Appendix A.4 gives the solution for Q.
First, we focus on the case where 4C = 0. The structure of the equilibria is almost identical to
that in Section 3.3; the key difference is that, while there is either one or no equilibria in Section 3.3,
there could be up to two equilibria now. This is highlighted in the following result.
Lemma 4. Suppose 4C = 0.
1. There exists a unique y¯ < k, such that there exists (f, x) ∈ Q that satisfies yj(f1, x1) = y if and
only if 0 ≤ y ≤ y¯ or y = k. Moreover,
y¯ =
(
1−O
(
1
N
))
k.
2. There exists a unique α¯x ∈ R+, such that αx ≤ α¯x if and only if there exists (f, x) ∈ Q that
satisfies yj(f1, x1) ≤ y¯, and a unique
¯
αx ∈ R+, such that αx ≥
¯
αx if and only if there exists
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(f, x) ∈ Q that satisfies yj(f1, x1) = k. Moreover, if
M < N
√
N + 1− 1,
then α¯x <
¯
αx, Q = ∅ for all αx ∈ (α¯x,
¯
αx), and
¯
αx−α¯x =
¯
αx ·O
(
1
N
)
. Otherwise, then α¯x ≥
¯
αx,
|Q| = 2 for all αx ∈ [
¯
αx, α¯x], and α¯x −
¯
αx =
¯
αx ·O
(
1
N
√
N
)
.
Therefore, there exists an open interval of follower productions (y¯, k) that are never symmetric
equilibria. As N increases, this interval shrinks to the empty set at the rate 1N . The latter is
independent of the number of leaders M or demand αx. However, M has an impact on whether
there might be no symmetric equilibria or multiple symmetric equilibria. In particular, when M <
N
√
N + 1 − 1, there are no symmetric equilibria when
¯
αx < αx < α¯x. Otherwise, when M ≥
N
√
N + 1− 1, there are two symmetric equilibria when α¯x ≤ αx ≤
¯
αx. This behavior illustrates a
tradeoff between the number of leaders and followers. The more followers in the system, the more
leaders are needed for there to exist symmetric equilibria in the market.
Next, we consider the case where 4C > 0. In this case, the structure of the equilibria has an
additional feature that was not present when4C = 0. In particular, when demand is low, followers
might not supply to the market. The next lemma highlights the structure of the transition to strictly
positive follower productions.
Lemma 5. Suppose 4C > 0. Let ζ1 = (M + 1)4C + min
(
MN4C,MNk + 2M√Nk4C). Then
there exists (f, x) ∈ Q, such that yj(f1, x1) = 0 if and only if αx ≤ ζ1. Furthermore, if αx >
(M + 1)4C, then yj(f1, x1) = 0 if and only if
(f, x) ∈
{
(f, x) ∈ R× R+
∣∣∣∣ x = 1M (αx − (4C − f)) and 0 ≤ f ≤ f¯
}
⊆ Q,
where f¯ > 0 if αx < ζ1.
The proof is omitted as it is a straightforward observation from Theorem 1. As the market
transitions from zero to strictly positive follower productions, there is a regime of demand where
there are multiple equilibria, characterized by leaders increasing supply when followers take larger
forward positions. This phenomenon is due to leaders using their commitment power to drive
followers out of the market (recall Lemma 2). Therefore, although followers are not supply-
ing to the market, their forward positions have an impact on the efficiency of the equilibrium.
Moreover, note that the size of the interval of demand values where this phenomenon occurs is
min
(
MN4C,MNk + 2M√Nk4C) = Θ (MN).
When demand is high, the structure of the equilibria is similar to that when 4C = 0, in that
there could be two or zero equilibria, except that the threshold for M now depends on 4C. Fur-
thermore, even in the limit as N tends to infinity, certain follower productions are never equilibria..
19
Lemma 6. Suppose 4C > 0.
1. There exists a unique y¯ < k, such that there exists (f, x) ∈ Q that satisfies yj(f1, x1) = y if and
only if y ≤ y¯ or y = k. Moreover,
y¯ =

(
1−O ( 1N )) (k − (√N+1−1)2N 4C) , if 4C < Nk(√N+1−1)2 ,
0, otherwise.
2. There exists a unique α¯x ∈ R+, such that αx ≤ α¯x if and only if there exists (f, x) ∈ Q that
satisfies yj(f1, x1) ≤ y¯, and a unique
¯
αx ∈ R+, such that αx ≥
¯
αx if and only if there exists
(f, x) ∈ Q that satisfies yj(f1, x1) = k. Moreover, if
M <

(N+1)k− N2+1
N2+(
√
N+1−1)2
(
Nk−(
√
N+1−1)24C
)
N4C−k+ N+1
N2+(
√
N+1−1)2
(
Nk−(
√
N+1−1)24C
) , if 4C < Nk
(
√
N+1−1)2 ,
(N+1)k−4C
Nk+4C−k+2√Nk4C , otherwise,
(3)
then α¯x <
¯
αx and Q = ∅ for all αx ∈ (α¯x,
¯
αx). Otherwise, α¯x ≥
¯
αx and |Q| = 2 for all
αx ∈ [
¯
αx, α¯x].
4.4 Inefficiency of the forward market
We compare the outcome against a Stackelberg competition where followers do not sell forward
contracts. Note that the symmetric equilibria of a Stackelberg competition are given by the sym-
metric reactions of the leaders when followers take neutral forward positions, i.e., X(0), where X
is defined in Section 4.2. Theorem 2 in Appendix A.4 gives the solution for X(0). The structure is
similar to the equilibria of the forward market. We highlight the key features in the following three
lemmas.
Lemma 7. Suppose 4C = 0.
1. There exists a unique y¯ < k, such that there exists x ∈ X(0) that satisfies yj(0, x1) = y if and
only if y ≤ y¯ or y = k. Moreover,
y¯ =
(
1 +O
(
1√
N
))
k
2
.
2. There exists a unique α¯x ∈ R+, such that αx ≤ α¯x if and only if there exists x ∈ X(0) that
satisfies yj(0, x1) ≤ y¯, and a unique
¯
αx ≤ α¯x, such that αx ≥
¯
αx if and only if there exists
x ∈ X(0) that satisfies yj(0, x1) = k. Moreover, |X(0)| = 2 for all αx ∈ [
¯
αx, α¯x].
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Again, we see that there is an open interval of follower productions (y¯, k) that are never sym-
metric equilibria. However, as N increases, this interval, instead of shrinking as in the case of the
forward market, expands at the rate 1√
N
to a size of k2 . That is, as the followers become more
competitive, the leaders are better able to exploit the capacity constraints of the followers.
When 4C > 0, followers might not supply to the market. The next lemma highlights the
structure of this regime.
Lemma 8. Suppose 4C > 0. Let ζ1 = (M + 1)4C + min
(
MN4C,MNk + 2M√Nk4C). Then
there exists x ∈ X(0) such that yj(0, x1) = 0 if and only if αx ≤ ζ1. Furthermore,
x =
 1M+1αx if 0 ≤ αx < (M + 1)4C,1
M (αx −4C) if (M + 1)4C ≤ αx ≤ ζ1,
The proof is omitted as it is a straightforward observation from Theorem 2. The key insight is
that this regime exhibits different behavior depending on whether αx is less than or greater than
(M + 1)4C. The leader productions increase at a faster rate when αx > (M + 1)4C because
leaders use their commitment power to drive followers out of the market.
When demand is high, the structure of the equilibria is similar to the case when4C = 0, except
that the range of follower productions that could be equilibria is now smaller. The larger the value
of 4C, the smaller the range of supportable follower productions.
Lemma 9. Suppose 4C > 0.
1. There exists a unique y¯ < k, such that there exist x ∈ X(0) that satisfies yj(0, x1) = y if and
only y ≤ y¯ or y = k. Moreover,
y¯ =

(
1 +O
(
1√
N
))
1
2
(
k − (
√
N+1−1)2
N 4C
)
, if 4C ≤ Nk
(
√
N+1−1)2 ,
0, otherwise.
2. There exists a unique α¯x ∈ R+, such that αx ≤ α¯x if and only if there exists x ∈ X(0) that
satisfies yj(0, x1) ≤ y¯, and a unique
¯
αx ≤ α¯x, such that αx ≥
¯
αx if and only if there exists
x ∈ X(0) that satisfies yj(0, x1) = k. Moreover, |X(0)| = 2 for all αx ∈ [
¯
αx, α¯x].
We now contrast the efficiency of the equilibria in the forward and Stackelberg markets. Given
follower and leader productions y and x respectively, let SW(y, x) denote the social welfare:
SW(y, x) :=
∫ Mx+Ny
0
P (w) dw − (MCx+Ncy) .
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The next lemma highlights that adding a forward market to a Stackelberg market could be ineffi-
cient.
Lemma 10. Suppose 4C = 0. Let
¯
αx := (M + N + 1)k and α¯x :=
(M+1)
√
N+1
2(
√
N+1−1) Nk. Then, for all
αx ∈ [
¯
αx, α¯x], there exists (f, x) ∈ Q and xS ∈ X(0) such that
Mx+Nyj(f1, x1) < MxS +Nyj(0, xS1),
SW(yj(f1, x1), x) < SW(yj(0, xS1), xS).
Moreover,
MxS +Nyj(0, xS1)
Mx+Nyj(f1, x1)
≤ (MN +M +N)(M + 1)
M(M + 1)(N + 1) + 2(N + 1−√N + 1) ,
SW(yj(0, xS1), xS)
SW(yj(f1, x1), x)
≤ (M + 1)
2(MN +M +N)(MN +M +N + 2)
(N + 1)
(
(M2 +M + 2)
√
N + 1− 2) ((M2 + 3M)√N + 1 + 2) ,
where the inequalities are tight.
This inefficiency is attributed to equilibria in the forward market where followers produce k
while there are equilibria in the Stackelberg market where followers produce strictly less than k.
Therefore, this inefficiency is due to leaders exploiting the capacity constraints of the followers in
the forward market. To see this, note that this inefficiency does not disappear even with a large
number of followers:
lim
N→∞
MxS +Nyj(0, xS1)
Mx+Nyj(f1, x1)
≤ (M + 1)
2
M2 +M + 2
,
lim
N→∞
SW(yj(0, xS1), xS)
SW(yj(f1, x1), x)
≤ (M + 1)
4
(M2 +M + 2)(M2 + 3M)
.
On the other hand, this inefficiency disappears with a large number of leaders:
lim
M→∞
MxS +Nyj(0, xS1)
Mx+Nyj(f1, x1)
≤ 1,
lim
M→∞
SW(yj(0, xS1), xS)
SW(yj(f1, x1), x)
≤ 1.
The statement of Lemma 10 does not specify whether there exists forward equilibria that are equally
or more efficient than Stackelberg equilibria. However, it is possible to impose further conditions
on the system and demand such that the Stackelberg equilibria are always strictly more efficient.
The same approach in the proof of Lemma 10 can be used to obtain bounds on the production
and efficiency losses when 4C > 0. However, the bounds are more complicated and depend on
4C and k.
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5 Conclusion
Forward contracts make up a significant share of trade in many markets ranging from finance to
cloud computing to commodities, e.g., gas and electricity. The general view is that forward trading
improves the efficiency of markets by providing a mechanism for participants to hedge risks and
mitigating market power. Since the seminal result by [1] that proved forward contracts can miti-
gate market power, there has been significant interest in understanding the generality of this phe-
nomenon. In this work, we show that leader-follower interactions may cause forward contracting
to be inefficient. This is because forward contracting increases followers outputs which may create
opportunities for leaders to exploit the capacity constraints of followers. Furthermore, we show
that the efficiency loss remains strictly positive even with a large number of followers (Lemma 10),
and hence this inefficiency may be attributed to oligopoly leaders. Our results contrast with prior
work that also showed that forward markets may not mitigate market power as those were due
to endogenous investment [22] or transmission congestion [17]. Our results are important due to
the prevalence of forward trading in some industries where there are leader-follower relationships
between the firms (e.g. gas and electricity).
Furthermore, due to our closed-form expressions for every symmetric equilibria (Theorems 1
and 2), we are able to characterize the behavior of the system explicitly which provide strate-
gic insights. One key characterisation is that there is an interval of follower productions just below
capacity that are never symmetric equilibria (including symmetric leader/follower reactions) (Lem-
mas 1, 3, 4, and 6). This phenomenon may be attributed to oligopoly followers since this interval
shrinks as the number of followers increase. Another key characterisation is that, if there are too
few leaders relative to followers, then there may not exist symmetric equilibria (Lemmas 4 and 6).
This tradeoff shows that, the more competitive the spot market, the easier it is for leaders to exploit
followers capacity constraints, which is reminiscent of the first-mover advantage in the classical
Stackelberg game. Therefore, temporal constraints may create differences in market power be-
tween firms.
The strategic interactions that we observed in this work could provide insights into behaviour
in other settings. To this point, we have not addressed the impact of the leaders production inflex-
ibility on the efficiency of the market, as our focus was on the efficiency of forward contracting.
Nevertheless, the insights obtained from our results allow us to conjecture the possible impacts. It
is well known that Stackelberg competition is less efficient than Cournot. Therefore, the natural
inference is that constraining the leader to choose productions in the first stage (versus it selling
forward contracts only and choosing productions in the second stage) would decrease the social
welfare. However, based on the phenomenon shown in our work, it is plausible that this intuition
is not always true. If the leader did not have to choose productions in the first stage, the added
competition would cause followers to produce more. But, if this causes followers to be capacity
constrained, then there might be opportunities for producers to exploit those constraints, resulting
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in a loss of efficiency or non-existence of equilibria altogether.
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A Closed-Form Solutions for Symmetric Equilibria
In this Appendix, we derive closed-form expressions for the symmetric follower reactions, sym-
metric leader reactions, the symmetric forward market equilibria, and the symmetric Stackelberg
equilibria. These results are used to derive the structural results in Section 4. We denote by αx and
αy the normalized leader and follower demands respectively, and by 4C the normalized marginal
cost gap:
αx =
1
β
(α− C),
αy =
1
β
(α− c),
4C = 1
β
(c− C).
We use the following notation. For scalars z, a, b ∈ R such that a ≤ b, let
[z]ba :=

a, if z ≤ a,
b, if z ≥ b,
z, otherwise.
We will use the following properties:
(i) For any c ∈ R, c+ [z]ba = [z + c]b+ca+c.
(ii) If c > 0, then c [z]ba = [cz]
cb
ca.
(iii) If c < 0, then c [z]ba = [cz]
ca
cb .
A.1 Spot Market Analyses
Proposition 1. Fix a follower l ∈ N and suppose fj = f for every j 6= l. There is a unique Nash
equilibrium y in the spot market such that, for each j 6= l,
yj =
[
1
N
(
αy + f −
M∑
i=1
xi − yl
)]k
0
. (4)
Proof. Proof. The uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium follows from Theorem 5 of [14]. Each
follower j ∈ N has a strategy set [0, k] which is compact. Its payoff function in the spot market φ(s)j
is continuous in all arguments and is strictly concave in yj . Thus, from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) conditions, we infer that y ∈ [0, k]N is a Nash equilibrium of the spot market, if and only if
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there exists λ,µ ∈ RN+ such that, for each j ∈ N :
∇yj
[
φ
(s)
j (yj ;y−j) + λjyj + µj(k − yj)
]
= 0, (5)
λjyj = µj(k − yj) = 0. (6)
Take any j 6= l. Expanding the LHS of (5) gives:
∇yj
[
φ
(s)
j (yj ;y−j) + λjyj + µj(k − yj)
]
= β
αy + f − M∑
i=1
xi − yj −
N∑
j′=1
yj′
+ λj − µj
= β
(
αy + f −
M∑
i=1
xi − yl −Nyj
)
+ λj − µj .
Suppose 0 < yj < k. Then (6) imply that λj = µj = 0. From (5), we obtain
yj =
1
N
(
αy + f −
M∑
i=1
xi − yl
)
. (7)
Suppose yj = 0. Then (6) imply that µj = 0. From (5), we obtain
−
(
αy + f −
M∑
i=1
xi − yl
)
= λj ≥ 0. (8)
Suppose yj = k. Then (6) imply that λj = 0. From (5), we obtain(
αy + f −
M∑
i=1
xi − yl −Nk
)
= µj ≥ 0. (9)
Since 0 ≤ yj ≤ k, (7) – (9) together imply that
yj =

0, if 1N
(
αy + f −
∑M
i=1 xi − yl
)
≤ 0,
k, if 1N
(
αy + f −
∑M
i=1 xi − yl
)
≥ k,
1
N
(
αy + f −
∑M
i=1 xi − yl
)
, otherwise,
which is equivalent to (4).
Proposition 2. Suppose fj = f for every j ∈ N . There is a unique Nash equilibrium in the spot
28
market, given by
yj =
[
1
N + 1
(
αy + f −
M∑
i=1
xi
)]k
0
. (10)
Proof. Proof. The uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium follows from Theorem 5 of [14]. Thus, it
suffices to show that the given productions form a Nash equilibrium. From the optimality conditions
in (5) – (6), we infer that y ∈ [0, k] is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the spot market, if and only
if there exists scalars λ, µ ∈ R+ such that,
β
(
αy + f −
M∑
i=1
xi − (N + 1)y
)
+ λ− µ = 0,
λy = µ (k − y) = 0.
Let
λ =
[
−β
(
αy + f −
M∑
i=1
xi − (N + 1)y
)]∞
0
,
µ =
[
β
(
αy + f −
M∑
i=1
xi − (N + 1)y
)]∞
0
.
It is straightforward to show that y defined in (10), and λ, µ defined above, together satisfy the
optimality conditions.
A.2 Follower Reaction Analyses
Proposition 3. Fix the leaders’ productions x ∈ RM+ . Let F ⊆ R denote the set of symmetric follower
reactions, i.e., for each f ∈ F and j ∈ N ,
φj (f ; f1,x) ≥ φj
(
f¯ ; f1,x
)
, ∀f¯ ∈ R. (11)
Let ξ := αy −
∑M
i=1 xi. Then,
F =

(−∞,−ξ] , if ξ < 0,{
N−1
N2+1
ξ
}
, if 0 ≤ ξ ≤ (N2+1)(N−1)
N2−2√N+1 k,
∅, if (N
2+1)(N−1)
N2−2√N+1 k < ξ < (N + 1) k,
[−ξ + (N + 1)k,∞) , if (N + 1) k ≤ ξ.
(12)
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Moreover, for each f ∈ F ,
yj(f1,x) = 0 ⇐⇒ ξ ≤ 0,
0 < yj(f1,x) < k ⇐⇒ 0 < ξ ≤ (N
2 + 1)(N − 1)
N2 − 2√N + 1 k,
yj(f1,x) = k ⇐⇒ (N + 1)k ≤ ξ.
Proof. Proof. The proof proceeds in three steps. In step 1, we reformulate a follower’s payoff max-
imization problem into a problem involving its production quantity only. In step 2, we compute its
payoff maximizing production quantity. In step 3, we compute the symmetric follower forward po-
sitions that satisfy the condition that every follower is producing at its payoff maximizing quantity.
The latter gives the set of symmetric follower reactions.
Step 1: Fix a follower l ∈ N and suppose fj = f for every j 6= l. Using Proposition 1 to
substitute for yj(fj ; f−j ,x) for every j 6= l, we infer that the total production in the spot market is
given by
N∑
j=1
yj(fj ; f−j ,x) = yl(fl; f1,x) + (N − 1)
[
1
N
(
αy + f −
M∑
i=1
xi − yl(fl; f1,x)
)]k
0
= yl(fl; f1,x) +
[
N − 1
N
(
αy + f −
M∑
i=1
xi − yl(fl; f1,x)
)](N−1)k
0
=
[
N − 1
N
(
αy + f −
M∑
i=1
xi
)
+
1
N
yl(fl; f1,x)
]yl(fl;f1,x)+(N−1)k
yl(fl;f1,x)
,
By substituting the above into follower l’s payoff, and using the fact that yl(R; f1,x) = [0, k], we
obtain
sup
fl∈R
φl(fl; f1,x) = sup
fl∈R
P
[N − 1
N
(
αy + f −
M∑
i=1
xi
)
+
1
N
yl(fl; f1,x)
]yl(fl;f1,x)+(N−1)k
yl(fl;f1,x)
+
M∑
i=1
xi
)
− c
)
· yl(fl; f1,x) (13)
= sup
y∈[0,k]
φˆl(y; f,x), (14)
where
φˆl(y; f,x) :=
P
[N − 1
N
(
αy + f −
M∑
i=1
xi
)
+
1
N
y
]y+(N−1)k
y
+
M∑
i=1
xi
− c
 · y.
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Step 2: We solve for the solution to (14). Substituting for the demand function yields
φˆl(y; f,x) = β
(
ξ −
[
N − 1
N
(ξ + f) +
1
N
y
]y+(N−1)k
y
)
y
=

β (ξ − y) y, if (15a) holds,β
(
1
N ξ − N−1N f − 1N y
)
y, if 0 ≤ y < ξ + f,
β (ξ − y) y, if k ≥ y ≥ ξ + f,
if (15b) holds,
β
(
1
N ξ − N−1N f − 1N y
)
y, if (15c) holds,β (ξ − y − (N − 1)k) y, if 0 ≤ y ≤ ξ + f −Nk,β ( 1N ξ − N−1N f − 1N y) y, if k ≥ y > ξ + f −Nk, if (15d) holds,
β (ξ − y − (N − 1)k) y, if (15e) holds,
where the second equality follows from the fact that y ∈ [0, k] and the five cases (15a) – (15e) are
defined by
ξ + f ≤ 0, (15a)
0 < ξ + f < k, (15b)
k ≤ ξ + f ≤ Nk, (15c)
Nk < ξ + f < (N + 1)k, (15d)
(N + 1)k ≤ ξ + f. (15e)
We analyze each case separately.
Case (i): ξ + f ≤ 0. Then φˆl(y; f,x) is a smooth function in y over the interval [0, k]. The first
and second derivatives are given by
∂
∂y
φˆl(y; f,x) = β (ξ − 2y) ,
∂2
∂y2
φˆl(y; f,x) = −2β < 0,
which implies that φˆl(y; f,x) is strictly concave in y. Thus, y is a solution to (14) if and only if it
satisfies the following first order optimality conditions:
∂+
∂y
φˆl(y; f,x) ≤ 0, if 0 ≤ y < k, (16)
∂−
∂y
φˆl(y; f,x) ≥ 0, if 0 < y ≤ k. (17)
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It is straightforward to show that there is a unique solution given by
y =
[
1
2
ξ
]k
0
. (18)
Case (ii): 0 < ξ + f < k. Then φˆl(y; f,x) is a piecewise smooth function in y over the interval
[0, k]. The first and second derivatives are given by
∂
∂y
φˆl(y; f,x) =
β
(
1
N ξ − N−1N f − 2N y
)
, if 0 ≤ y < ξ + f,
β (ξ − 2y) , if k ≥ y > ξ + f,
∂2
∂y2
φˆl(y; f,x) =
− 2N β, if 0 ≤ y < ξ + f,−2β, if k ≥ y > ξ + f,
< 0.
Moreover, we have
∂+
∂y
φˆl(y; f,x)
∣∣∣∣
y=ξ+f
= β (−ξ − 2f)
=
1
N
β (−Nξ − 2Nf)
≤ 1
N
β (−ξ + (N − 1)f − 2Nf)
=
1
N
β (ξ − (N − 1)f − 2ξ − 2f)
=
∂−
∂y
φˆl(y; f,x)
∣∣∣∣
y=ξ+f
,
where the inequality follows from the fact that ξ+f > 0. Thus, φˆl(y; f,x) is concave in y over [0, k].
Therefore, y is a solution to (14) if and only if it satisfies the first order optimality conditions (16) –
(17). It is straightforward to show that there is a unique solution given by
y =

0, if ξ ≤ (N − 1)f,
1
2 (ξ − (N − 1) f) , if ξ > max((N − 1)f,−(N + 1)f),
ξ + f, if − 2f ≤ ξ ≤ −(N + 1)f,
1
2ξ, if ξ < min(2k,−2f),
k, if ξ ≥ 2k.
(19)
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Case (iii): k ≤ ξ + f ≤ Nk. Then φˆl(y; f,x) is a smooth function in y over the interval [0, k]. The
first and second derivatives are given by
∂
∂y
φˆl(y; f,x) = β
(
1
N
ξ − N − 1
N
f − 2
N
y
)
,
∂2
∂y2
φˆl(y; f,x) = − 2
N
β < 0,
which implies that φˆl(y; f,x) is strictly concave in y. Thus, y is a solution to (14) if and only if it
satisfies the first order optimality conditions (16) – (17). It is straightforward to show that there is
a unique solution given by
y =
[
1
2
(ξ − (N − 1)f)
]k
0
. (20)
Case (iv): Nk < ξ + f < (N + 1)k. Then φˆl(y; f,x) is a piecewise smooth function in y over the
interval [0, k]. The first and second derivatives are given by
∂
∂y
φˆl(y; f,x) =
β (ξ − 2y − (N − 1)k) , if 0 ≤ y < ξ + f −Nk,β ( 1N ξ − N−1N f − 2N y) , if k ≥ y > ξ + f −Nk,
∂2
∂y2
φˆl(y; f,x) =
−2β, if 0 ≤ y < ξ + f −Nk,− 2N β, if k ≥ y > ξ + f −Nk,
< 0.
It is straightforward to check that φˆl(y; f,x) is not concave in y over the interval [0, k]. However,
φˆl(y; f,x) is piecewise concave in y. Therefore, solve the following sub-problems:
sup
y∈[0,ξ+f−(N−1)k]
φˆl(y; f,x), (21)
and
sup
y∈[ξ+f−(N−1)k,k]
φˆl(y; f,x). (22)
The solution of the sub-problem with the larger optimal value is the solution to (14). Using the
first-order optimality conditions, the unique solution to (21) is given by
y =
[
1
2
(ξ − (N − 1)k)
]ξ+f−Nk
0
=: z1,
33
and that to (22) is given by
y =
[
1
2
(ξ − (N − 1)f)
]k
ξ+f−Nk
=: z2.
Therefore, the solution(s) to (14) are given by:
y = z1, if φˆl(z1; f,x) > φˆl(z2; f,x), (23a)
y = z2, if φˆl(z1; f,x) < φˆl(z2; f,x), (23b)
y = z1 or z2, if φˆl(z1; f,x) = φˆl(z2; f,x). (23c)
Case (v): (N + 1)k ≤ ξ+ f . Then φˆl(y; f,x) is a smooth function in y over the interval [0, k]. The
first and second derivatives are given by
∂
∂y
φˆl(y; f,x) = β (ξ − (N − 1)k − 2y) ,
∂2
∂y2
φˆl(y; f,x) = −2β < 0,
which implies that φˆl(y; f,x) is strictly concave in y. Therefore, y is a solution to (14) if and only if
it satisfies the first order optimality conditions (16) – (17). It is straightforward to show that there
is a unique solution given by
y =
[
1
2
(ξ − (N − 1)k)
]k
0
. (24)
Step 3: We solve for the symmetric follower forward positions that satisfy the condition that
every follower is producing at its payoff maximizing quantity. The latter gives the set of symmetric
follower reactions since
φl (f ; f1,x) ≥ φl
(
f¯ ; f1,x
)
, ∀f¯ ∈ R
⇐⇒ φˆl (yl(f ; f1,x); f,x) ≥ φˆl
(
yl(f¯ ; f1,x); f,x
)
, ∀f¯ ∈ R
⇐⇒ φˆl (y; f,x) ≥ φˆl (y¯; f1,x); f,x) , ∀y¯ ∈ [0, k] , and y =
[
1
N + 1
(ξ + f)
]k
0
. (25)
The first equivalence is due to (13). The second equivalence is due to the fact that yl(f ; f1,x) =[
1
N+1 (ξ + f)
]k
0
and yl (R; f1,x) = [0, k]. We divide the analyses into five cases depending on the
value of ξ + f .
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Case (i): ξ+ f ≤ 0. Note that y is given by (18). Therefore, the symmetric follower reactions are
given by: [
1
2
ξ
]k
0
=
[
1
N + 1
(ξ + f)
]k
0
and (15a) holds ⇐⇒
[
1
2
ξ
]k
0
= 0 and (15a) holds
⇐⇒ ξ ≤ 0 and f ≤ −ξ. (26)
Case (ii): 0 < ξ+f < k. Note that y is given by (19). Since 0 < ξ+f < k =⇒ 0 < 1N+1 (ξ + f) <
k, the symmetric follower reactions are given by:
1
2
(ξ − (N − 1)f) = 1
N + 1
(ξ + f) and ξ > max((N − 1)f,−(N + 1)f) and (15b) holds
or ξ + f =
1
N + 1
(ξ + f) and − 2f ≤ ξ ≤ −(N + 1)f and (15b) holds
or
1
2
ξ =
1
N + 1
(ξ + f) and ξ < min(2k,−2f) and (15b) holds
⇐⇒ f = N − 1
N2 + 1
ξ and ξ > max((N − 1)f,−(N + 1)f) and (15b) holds
or f = −ξ and − 2f ≤ ξ ≤ −(N + 1)f and (15b) holds
or f =
N − 1
2
ξ and ξ < min(2k,−2f) and (15b) holds
⇐⇒ f = N − 1
N2 + 1
ξ and ξ > max
(
(N − 1)2
N2 + 1
ξ,−N
2 − 1
N2 + 1
ξ
)
and 0 < ξ <
N2 + 1
N(N + 1)
k
or f =
N − 1
2
ξ and ξ < min(2k,−(N − 1)ξ) and 0 < N + 1
2
ξ < k
⇐⇒ f = N − 1
N2 + 1
ξ and 0 < ξ <
N2 + 1
N(N + 1)
k. (27)
The second equivalence is due to the fact that f = −ξ =⇒ ξ+ f = 0. The third equivalence is due
to the fact that ξ > 0 =⇒ (N−1)2
N2+1
ξ ≥ −N2−1
N2+1
ξ and N+12 ξ > 0 =⇒ 2k > −(N − 1)ξ.
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Case (iii): k ≤ ξ + f ≤ Nk. Note that y is given by (20). Therefore, the symmetric follower
reactions are given by:[
1
2
(ξ − (N − 1)f)
]k
0
=
[
1
N + 1
(ξ + f)
]k
0
and (15c) holds
⇐⇒ 1
2
(ξ − (N − 1)f) = 1
N + 1
(ξ + f) and (15c) holds and 0 <
1
2
(ξ − (N − 1)f) < k
⇐⇒ f = N − 1
N2 + 1
ξ and (15c) holds and 0 <
1
2
(ξ − (N − 1)f) < k
⇐⇒ f = N − 1
N2 + 1
ξ and
N2 + 1
N(N + 1)
k ≤ ξ ≤ N
2 + 1
N + 1
k and 0 < ξ <
N2 + 1
N − 12
k
⇐⇒ f = N − 1
N2 + 1
ξ and
N2 + 1
N(N + 1)
k ≤ ξ ≤ N
2 + 1
N + 1
k. (28)
The first equivalence is due to the fact that (15c) =⇒ 0 < 1N+1 (ξ + f) < k. The last equivalence
is due to the fact that N
2+1
N(N+1) <
N2+1
N+1 <
N2+1
N− 1
2
.
Case (iv): Nk < ξ + f < (N + 1)k. Note that y is described by (23). We show that there does
not exist a symmetric follower reaction such that y = z1. Suppose otherwise. By Proposition 1, for
each j 6= l,
yj =
[
1
N
(
ξ + f −
[
1
2
(ξ − (N − 1)k)
]ξ+f−Nk
0
)]k
0
=
[
− 1
N
[
1
2
(−ξ − 2f − (N − 1)k)
]−Nk
−ξ−f
]k
0
=
[[
1
2N
(ξ + 2f + (N − 1)k)
] 1
N
(ξ+f)
k
]k
0
= k
However, (15d) =⇒ 1N+1 (ξ + f) < k =⇒ y < k = yj , which contradicts with the fact that a
symmetric follower reaction implies symmetric productions (by Proposition 2).
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Therefore, the symmetric follower reactions are given by:[
1
2
(ξ − (N − 1)f)
]k
ξ+f−Nk
=
1
N + 1
(ξ + f) and (15d) holds and φˆl(z1; f,x) ≤ φˆl(z2; f,x)
⇐⇒ 1
2
(ξ − (N − 1)f) = 1
N + 1
(ξ + f) and (15d) holds and φˆl(z1; f,x) ≤ φˆl(z2; f,x)
⇐⇒ f = N − 1
N2 + 1
ξ and (15d) holds and φˆl(z1; f,x) ≤ φˆl(z2; f,x)
⇐⇒ f = N − 1
N2 + 1
ξ and
N2 + 1
N + 1
k < ξ <
N2 + 1
N
k and φˆl(z1; f,x) ≤ φˆl(z2; f,x)
⇐⇒ f = N − 1
N2 + 1
ξ and
N2 + 1
N + 1
k < ξ ≤ (N
2 + 1)(N − 1)
N2 − 2√N + 1 k. (29)
The first equivalence follows from the fact that ξ + f −Nk = 1N+1 (ξ + f) =⇒ ξ + f = (N + 1)k
and k = 1N+1 (ξ + f) =⇒ ξ+ f = (N + 1)k. The last equivalence follows from the following facts.
First, note that
z1 =
[
1
2
(ξ − (N − 1)k)
]N(N+1)
N2+1
ξ−Nk
0
=

N(N+1)
N2+1
ξ −Nk, if N2+1N+1 k < ξ < N
2+1
N k and
1
2 (ξ − (N − 1)k) > N(N+1)N2+1 ξ −Nk,
1
2 (ξ − (N − 1)k) , if N
2+1
N+1 k < ξ <
N2+1
N k and
1
2 (ξ − (N − 1)k) ≤ N(N+1)N2+1 ξ −Nk,
=

N(N+1)
N2+1
ξ −Nk, if N2+1N+1 k < ξ < (N+1)(N
2+1)
N2+2N−1 k,
1
2 (ξ − (N − 1)k) , (N+1)(N
2+1)
N2+2N−1 k ≤ ξ < N
2+1
N k.
where the second equality is due to ξ > N
2+1
N+1 k >
N2−1
N+1 k = (N − 1)k. Thus, if N
2+1
N+1 k < ξ <
(N+1)(N2+1)
N2+2N−1 k, then
φˆl(z1; f,x) ≤ φˆl(z2; f,x)
⇐⇒ (ξ − (N − 1)k − z1) z1 ≤ 1
N
(ξ − (N − 1)f − z2) z2
⇐⇒ (k − f) (ξ + f −Nk) ≤ 1
4N
(ξ − (N − 1)f)2
⇐⇒ True.
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On the other hand, if (N+1)(N
2+1)
N2+2N−1 k ≤ ξ < N
2+1
N k, then
φˆl(z1; f,x) ≤ φˆl(z2; f,x)
⇐⇒ (ξ − (N − 1)k − z1) z1 ≤ 1
N
(ξ − (N − 1)f − z2) z2
⇐⇒ 1
2
(ξ − (N − 1)k)2 ≤ 1
4N
(ξ − (N − 1)f)2
⇐⇒ ξ ≤ (N
2 + 1)(N − 1)
N2 − 2√N + 1 k,
where (N+1)(N
2+1)
N2+2N−1 k ≤ (N
2+1)(N−1)
N2−2√N+1 k <
N2+1
N k.
Case (v): (N + 1)k ≤ ξ + f . Note that y is given by (24). Therefore, the symmetric follower
reactions are given by: [
1
2
(ξ − (N − 1)k)
]k
0
=
[
1
N + 1
(ξ + f)
]k
0
and (15e) holds
⇐⇒
[
1
2
(ξ − (N − 1)k)
]k
0
= k and (15e) holds
⇐⇒ f ≥ −ξ + (N + 1)k and ξ ≥ (N + 1)k. (30)
Putting together the descriptions in (26) – (30) yield (12).
A.3 Leader Reaction Analyses
Proposition 4. Fix the followers’ forward positions f = f1 ∈ RN . Let X ⊆ R+ denote the set of
symmetric leader reactions, i.e., for each x ∈ X and i ∈M ,
ψi (x;x1, f1) ≥ ψi (x¯;x1, f1) , ∀x¯ ∈ R+. (31)
Let:
x1 =
1
M + 1
[αx]
∞
0 ,
x2 =
1
M
(αx −4C + f) ,
x3 =
1
M + 1
[αx +N (4C − f)]∞0 ,
x4 =
1
M + 1
[αx −Nk]∞0 .
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Then,
X =

x ∈ R+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x = x1 if f −4C < − αxM+1 ,
or x = x2 if − αxM+1 ≤ f −4C ≤ min
(
− αxMN+M+1 , η4
)
,
or x = x3 if − αxNM+M+1 < f −4C ≤ max (η3, k − (αx −Nk)) ,
or x = x4 if f −4C ≥

k − (αx −Nk), if αx < Nk,
η2, if αx ≥
(
1 + (M+1)
√
N+1
(
√
N+1−1)2
)
Nk,
η1, otherwise.

,
where
η1 := k − αx−NkN
(
2(
√
N+1−1)
M+1
)
,
η2 := −12
(
2(αx−Nk)
M+1 +Nk
)1−√1− ( 2(αx−Nk)M+12(αx−Nk)
M+1
+Nk
)2 ,
η3 := k − αx−NkN
(
2(
√
N+1−1)
2+(M−1)√N+1
)
,
η4 := −12
(
2(αx−MNk)
M+1 +
(
2M
M+1
)2
Nk
)(
1−
√
1−
(
2(αx−MNk)
M+1
2(αx−MNk)
M+1
+( 2MM+1)
2
Nk
)2)
.
Moreover, for each x ∈ X,
yj(f1, x1) = 0 ⇐⇒ x = x1 or x2,
0 < yj(f1, x1) < k ⇐⇒ x = x3,
yj(f1, x1) = k ⇐⇒ x = x4.
Proof. Proof. The proof proceeds in three steps. In step 1, we solve for a leader’s payoff maximizing
production quantity given that all other leaders produce equal quantities. In step 2, we solve for
the symmetric leader productions that satisfy the condition that every leader is producing at its
payoff maximizing quantity. The latter gives the set of symmetric leader reactions. In step 3, we
explain how the solutions obtained in step 2 is equivalent to X.
Step 1: Fix a leader l ∈M and suppose xi = x for every i 6= l. We solve for the solution to
sup
xl∈R+
ψl (xl;x1, f1) . (32)
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Substituting for the demand function yields
ψl (xl;x1, f1) = β
αx − xl − (M − 1)x− N∑
j=1
yj(f1, xl, x1)
xl
where the follower productions are given by
N∑
j=1
yj(f1, xl, x1)
= N
[
1
N + 1
(αy + f − xl − (M − 1)x)
]k
0
=

0, if (33a) holds,0, if αy + f − xl − (M − 1)x ≤ 0,N
N+1 (αy + f − xl − (M − 1)x) , otherwise,
if (33b) holds,
0, if αy + f − xl − (M − 1)x ≤ 0,
k, if αy + f − xl − (M − 1)x ≥ (N + 1)k,
N
N+1 (αy + f − xl − (M − 1)x) , otherwise,
if (33c) holds,
where the second equality is due to the fact that xl, x ≥ 0 and the three cases (33a) – (33c) are
defined by
αy + f − (M − 1)x ≤ 0, (33a)
0 < αy + f − (M − 1)x ≤ (N + 1)k, (33b)
(N + 1)k < αy + f − (M − 1)x. (33c)
We analyze each case separately.
Case (i): αy + f − (M − 1)x < 0. We obtain
ψl (xl;x1, f1) = β (αx − xl − (M − 1)x)xl.
Therefore, ψl(xl;x1, f1) is a smooth function in xl over R+. The first and second derivatives are
given by
∂
∂xl
ψl (xl;x1, f1) = β (αx − (M − 1)x− 2xl) ,
∂2
∂x2l
ψl (xl;x1, f1) = −2β < 0,
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which implies that ψl (xl;x1, f1) is strictly concave in xl. Therefore, xl is a solution to (32) if and
only if it satisfies the following first order optimality conditions:
∂+
∂xl
ψl (xl;x1, f1) ≤ 0, if 0 ≤ xl, (34)
∂−
∂xl
ψl (xl;x1, f1) ≥ 0, if 0 < xl. (35)
It is straightforward to show that there is a unique solution is given by
xl =
[
1
2
(αx − (M − 1)x)
]∞
0
. (36)
Case (ii): 0 ≤ αy + f − (M − 1)x < (N + 1)k. We obtain
ψl (xl;x1, f1) =
β (αx − xl − (M − 1)x)xl, if xl ≥ αy + f − (M − 1)x,β ( 1N+1αx + NN+1 (4C − f)− M−1N+1 x− 1N+1xl)xl, otherwise.
Therefore, ψl (xl;x1, f1) is a piecewise smooth function in xl over R+. The first and second deriva-
tives are given by
∂
∂xl
ψl (xl;x1, f1) =
β (αx − (M − 1)x− 2xl) , if xl > αy + f − (M − 1)x,β
N+1 (αx +N (4C − f)− (M − 1)x− 2xl) , otherwise,
∂2
∂x2l
ψl (xl;x1, f1) =
−2β, if xl > αy + f − (M − 1)x,− 2N+1β, otherwise,
< 0.
Moreover, we have
∂−
∂xl
ψl (xl;x1, f1)
∣∣∣∣
xl=αy+f−(M−1)x
= β
(
1
N + 1
αx +
N
N + 1
(4C + f)− M − 1
N + 1
x− 2
N + 1
(αy + f − (M − 1)x)
)
= β
(
−αx + 2 (4C − f) + N
N + 1
(αy + f) +
M − 1
N + 1
x
)
≥ β (−αx + 2 (4C − f) + (M − 1)x)
=
∂+
∂xl
ψl (xl;x1, f1)
∣∣∣∣
xl=αy+f−(M−1)x
,
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where the inequality follows from (33b). Therefore, ψl (xl;x1, f1) is concave in xl over R+. There-
fore, xl is a solution to (32) if and only if it satisfies the first order optimality conditions (34) – (35).
It is straightforward to show that there is a unique solution given by
xl =

0, if (38a) holds,
1
2 (αx +N (4C − f)− (M − 1)x) , if (38b) holds,
αx −4C + f − (M − 1)x, if (38c) holds,
1
2 (αx − (M − 1)x) , if (38d) holds,
(37)
where the cases (38a) – (38d) are defined by:
αx +N (4C − f) ≤ (M − 1)x, (38a)
(M − 1)x < min (αx +N(4C − f), αx − (N + 2)(4C − f)) , (38b)
αx − (N + 2)(4C − f) ≤ (M − 1)x ≤ αx − 2(4C − f), (38c)
αx − 2(4C − f) < (M − 1)x. (38d)
Case (iii): (N + 1)k ≤ αy + f − (M − 1)x. We obtain
ψl (xl;x1, f1)
=

β (αx − xl − (M − 1)x)xl, if xl ≥ αy + f − (M − 1)x,
β (αx − xl − (M − 1)x−Nk)xl, if xl ≤ αy + f − (M − 1)x− (N + 1)k,
β
(
1
N+1αx +
N
N+1 (4C − f)− M−1N+1 x− 1N+1xl
)
xl, otherwise.
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Therefore, φl (xl;x1, f1) is a piecewise smooth function in xl over R+. The first and second deriva-
tives are given by
∂
∂xl
ψl (xl;x1, f1)
=

β (αx − (M − 1)x− 2xl) , if xl > αy + f − (M − 1)x,
β (αx − (M − 1)x−Nk − 2xl) , if xl < αy + f − (M − 1)x− (N + 1)k,
β
N+1 (αx +N (4C − f)− (M − 1)x− 2xl) , otherwise,
∂2
∂x2l
ψl (xl;x1, f1)
=

−2β, if xl > αy + f − (M − 1)x,
−2β, if xl < αy + f − (M − 1)x− (N + 1k,
− 2N+1β, otherwise,
< 0.
Moreover, we have
∂−
∂xl
ψl (xl;x1, f1)
∣∣∣∣
xl=αy+f−(M−1)x
= β
(
1
N + 1
αx +
N
N + 1
(4C − f)− M − 1
N + 1
x− 2
N + 1
(αy + f − (M − 1)x)
)
= β
(
−αx + 2(4C − f) + N
N + 1
(αx −4C + f) + M − 1
N + 1
x
)
> β (−αx + 2(4C − f) + (M − 1)x)
=
∂+
∂xl
ψl (xl;x1, f1)
∣∣∣∣
xl=αy+f−(M−1)x
.
Therefore, φl (xl;x1, f1) is concave in xl over [αy + f − (M − 1)x− (N + 1)k,∞). However, it is
straightforward to check that φl (xl;x1, f1) has a non-concave kink at xl = αy + f − (M − 1)x −
(N + 1)k, and therefore φl (xl;x1, f1) is not concave in xl over R+. Therefore, solve the following
sub-problems:
sup
xl∈[0,αy+f−(M−1)x−(N+1)k]
ψl (xl;x1, f1) , (39)
and
sup
xl∈[αy+f−(M−1)x−(N+1)k,∞)
ψl (xl;x1, f1) . (40)
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The solution of the sub-problem with the larger optimal value is the solution to (32). Using the
first order optimality conditions, the unique solution to (39) is given by
xl =
[
1
2
(αx − (M − 1)x−Nk)
]αy+f−(M−1)x−(N+1)k
0
=: z1,
and that to (40) is given by
xl =

αy + f − (M − 1)x− (N + 1)k, if (41a) holds,
1
2 (αx +N(4C − f)− (M − 1)x) , if (41b) holds,
αy + f − (M − 1)x, if (41c) holds,
1
2 (αx − (M − 1)x) , if (41d) holds,
=: z2.
where the cases (41a) – (41d) are defined by:
(M − 1)x ≤ αx − (N + 2)(4C − f)− 2(N + 1)k, (41a)
αx − (N + 2)(4C − f)− 2(N + 1)k < (M − 1)x < αx − (N + 2)(4C − f), (41b)
αx − (N + 2)(4C − f) ≤ (M − 1)x ≤ αx − 2(4C − f), (41c)
αx − 2(4C − f) < (M − 1)x. (41d)
Therefore, the solution(s) to (32) are given by:
xl = z1, if ψl (z1;x1, f1) > ψl (z2;x1, f1) , (42a)
xl = z2, if φl (z2;x1, f1) > φl (z1;x1, f1) , (42b)
xl = z1 or z2, if ψl (z1;x1, f1) = ψl (z2;x1, f1) . (42c)
Step 2: We solve for the symmetric leader productions that satisfy the condition that every leader
is producing at its payoff maximizing quantity. We divide the analyses into three cases depending
on the value of αy + f − (M − 1)x.
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Case (i): αy + f − (M − 1)x < 0. Note that xl is given by (36). Therefore, the symmetric leader
reactions are given by:
x = 0 and αx < (M − 1)x and (33a) holds
or x =
1
2
(αx − (M − 1)x) and αx ≥ (M − 1)x and (33a) holds
⇐⇒ x = 0 and αx < 0 and (33a) holds
or x =
1
M + 1
αx and αx ≥ 0 and (33a) holds.
Case (ii): 0 ≤ αy + f − (M − 1)x < (N + 1)k. Note that xl is given by (37). Therefore, the
symmetric leader reactions are given by:
x = 0 and (38a) and (33b) holds
or x =
1
2
((N + 1)αx −N(αy + f)− (M − 1)x) and (38b) and (33b) holds
or x = αy + f − (M − 1)x and (38c) and (33b) holds
or x =
1
2
(αx − (M − 1)x) and (38d) and (33b) holds
⇐⇒ x = 0 and αx
N
≤ f −4C and (33b) holds
or x =
1
M + 1
(αx +N(4C − f)) and − αx
NM +M + 1
< f −4C < αx
N
and (33b) holds
or x =
1
M
(αx − (4C − f)) and − αx
M + 1
≤ f −4C ≤ − αx
NM +M + 1
and (33b) holds
or x =
1
M + 1
αx and f −4C < − αx
M + 1
and (33b) holds.
Case (iii): (N + 1)k ≤ αy + f − (M − 1)x. Note that xl is described by (42). Therefore, the
symmetric leader reactions are given by
x = z1 and (33c) holds and ψl (z1;x1, f1) > ψl (z2;x1, f1) (43)
or x = z2 and (33c) holds and ψl (z1;x1, f1) < ψl (z2;x1, f1) (44)
or x = z1 or z2 and (33c) holds and ψl (z1;x1, f1) = ψl (z2;x1, f1) . (45)
We analyze the cases x = z1 and x = z2 separately.
45
Suppose x = z1 is a symmetric leader reaction. Since
∂−
∂xl
ψl(xl;x1, f1)
∣∣∣∣
xl=αy+f−(M−1)x−(N+1)k
= β (−αx + 2(4C − f) + (M − 1)x+ (N + 2)k)
≤ β
N + 1
(−αx + (N + 2)(4C − f) + (M − 1)x+ 2(N + 1)k)
=
∂+
∂xl
ψl(xl;x1, f1)
∣∣∣∣
xl=αy+f−(M−1)x−(N+1)k
,
we infer that x < αy + f − (M − 1)x− (N + 1)k. Therefore, we obtain
x = z1
⇐⇒ x = 0 and (33c) holds and ψl (z1;x1, f1) ≥ ψl (z2;x1, f1) and αx − (M − 1)x−Nk ≤ 0
or x =
1
2
(αx − (M − 1)x−Nk) and (33c) holds and ψl (z1;x1, f1) ≥ ψl (z2;x1, f1)
and 0 <
1
2
(αx − (M − 1)x−Nk) < αy + f − (M − 1)x− (N + 1)k
⇐⇒ x = 0 and (33c) holds and αx −Nk ≤ 0
or x =
1
M + 1
(αx −Nk) and (33c) holds and ψl (z1;x1, f1) ≥ ψl (z2;x1, f1)
and αx −Nk > 0 and f −4C > − 1
M + 1
(αx −Nk) + k
The second equivalence follows from solving for x in the equations, and the fact that in the case
x = 0, the inequalities (33c) and αx −Nk ≤ 0 =⇒ ψl (z1;x1, f1) ≥ ψl (z2;x1, f1).
Suppose x = z2. Then, using the same arguments in (43), we infer that x < αy + f − (M −
46
1)x− (N + 1)k. Therefore, we obtain
x = z2
⇐⇒ x = 1
2
(αx +N(4C − f)− (M − 1)x) and (33c) and (41b) holds
and ψl (z1;x1, f1) ≤ ψl (z2;x1, f1)
or x = αx + (f −4C)− (M − 1)x and (33c) and (41c) holds
and ψl (z1;x1, f1) ≤ ψl (z2;x1, f1)
or x =
1
2
(αx − (M − 1)x) and (33c) and (41d) holds
and ψl (z1;x1, f1) ≤ ψl (z2;x1, f1)
⇐⇒ x = 1
M + 1
(αx +N(4C − f)) and (33c) holds and ψl (z1;x1, f1) ≤ ψl (z2;x1, f1)
and − 1
NM +M + 1
αx < f −4C < 1
NM +M + 1
(−αx + (M + 1)(N + 1)k)
or x =
1
M
(αx + (f −4C)) and (33c) holds and ψl (z1;x1, f1) ≤ ψl (z2;x1, f1)
and − 1
M + 1
αx ≤ f −4C ≤ − 1
NM +M + 1
αx
or x =
1
M + 1
αx and (33c) holds and and f −4C < − 1
M + 1
αx
The second equivalence follows from solving for x in the equations, and the fact that in the case
x = 1M+1αx, the inequalities (33c) and f −4C < − 1M+1αx =⇒ ψl (z1;x1, f1) ≤ ψl (z2;x1, f1).
Step 3: We explain how the solutions obtained in step 2 is equivalent to X. Observe that step 2
obtains five cases for x:
x =
1
M + 1
αx,
x =
1
M
(αx − (4C − f)) ,
x =
1
M + 1
(αx +N(4C − f)) ,
x =
1
M + 1
(αx −Nk) ,
x = 0.
We analyze each case separately.
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Case (i): x = 1M+1αx. This case is characterized by
αx ≥ 0 and (33a) holds
or f −4C < − αx
M + 1
and (33b) holds
or f −4C < − αx
M + 1
and (33c) holds
⇐⇒ αx ≥ 0 and f −4C < − αx
M + 1
.
The equivalence is due to the following facts. First, (33b) =⇒ αx ≥ 0 and (33c) =⇒ αx ≥ 0.
Second, (33a) and αx ≥ 0 =⇒ f −4C < − 1M+1αx. Third, (33a), (33b), (33c) =⇒ True.
Case (ii): x = 1M (αx − (4C − f)). This case is characterized by
− αx
M + 1
≤ f −4C ≤ − αx
NM +M + 1
and (33b) holds
or − αx
M + 1
≤ f −4C ≤ − αx
NM +M + 1
and ψl (z1;x1, f1) ≤ ψl (z2;x1, f1) and (33c) holds
⇐⇒ − αx
M + 1
≤ f −4C ≤ min
(
− αx
NM +M + 1
,−αx +M(N + 1)k
)
or − αx
M + 1
≤ f −4C ≤ − αx
NM +M + 1
and f −4C ≤ η4 and f −4C > −αx +M(N + 1)k
⇐⇒ − αx
M + 1
≤ f −4C ≤ min
(
− αx
MN +M + 1
, η4
)
.
The first equivalence is due to the following facts. First, (33b) ⇐⇒ −αx < f − 4C ≤ −αx +
M(N + 1)k. Second, ψl (z1;x1, f1) ≤ ψl (z2;x1, f1) ⇐⇒ f − 4C ≤ η4. Third, (33c) ⇐⇒
f − 4C > −αx + M(N + 1)k. The second equivalence is due to the fact that − αxMN+M+1 ≤
−αx +M(N + 1)k =⇒ η4 > − αxMN+M+1 .
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Case (iii): x = 1M+1 (αx +N(4C − f)). This case is characterized by
− αx
NM +M + 1
< f −4C < αx
N
and (33b) holds
or − αx
NM +M + 1
< f −4C < 1
NM +M + 1
(−αx + (M + 1)(N + 1)k)
and ψl (z1;x1, f1) ≤ ψl (z2;x1, f1) and (33c) holds
⇐⇒ − αx
NM +M + 1
< f −4C < αx
N
and f −4C ≤ −2αx + (M + 1)(N + 1)k
M + 1 +N(M − 1)
or − αx
NM +M + 1
< f −4C < 1
NM +M + 1
(−αx + (M + 1)(N + 1)k)
and f −4C ≤ η3 and f −4C > −2αx + (M + 1)(N + 1)k
M + 1 +N(M − 1)
⇐⇒ αx < Nk and − αx
NM +M + 1
< f −4C < αx
N
or αx ≥ Nk and − αx
NM +M + 1
< f −4C ≤ η3.
The first equivalence is due to the following facts. First, (33b) ⇐⇒ − 2αxM+1+N(M−1) < f −4C ≤
−2αx+(M+1)(N+1)k
M+1+N(M−1) . Second, (33c) ⇐⇒ f − 4C > −2αx+(M+1)(N+1)kM+1+N(M−1) . Third, ψl (z1;x1, f1) ≤
ψl (z2;x1, f1) ⇐⇒ f −4C ≤ η3. The second equivalence is due to the following facts. First, αxN ≤
−2αx+(M+1)(N+1)k
M+1+N(M−1) ⇐⇒ αx ≤ Nk. Second, αx ≥ Nk =⇒ η3 < 1NM+M+1 (−αx + (M + 1)(N + 1)k).
Case (iv): x = 1M+1 (αx −Nk). This case is characterized by
αx −Nk > 0 and f −4C > − 1
M + 1
(αx −Nk) + k
and ψl (z1;x1, f1) ≥ ψl (z2;x1, f1) and (33c) holds
⇐⇒ αx −Nk > 0 and f −4C > − 1
M + 1
(αx −Nk) + k and ψl (z1;x1, f1) ≥ ψl (z2;x1, f1)
⇐⇒ Nk < αx <
(
1 +
(M + 1)
√
N + 1
(
√
N + 1− 1)2
)
Nk and f −4C ≥ η1
or
(
1 +
(M + 1)
√
N + 1
(
√
N + 1− 1)2
)
Nk ≤ αx and f −4C ≥ η2.
The first equivalence is due to the fact that (33c) =⇒ f − 4C > − 1M+1(αx − Nk) + k. The
second equivalence is due to the fact that ψl (z1;x1, f1) ≥ ψl (z2;x1, f1) ⇐⇒ Nk < αx <(
1 + (M+1)
√
N+1
(
√
N+1−1)2
)
Nk and f −4C ≥ η1 or
(
1 + (M+1)
√
N+1
(
√
N+1−1)2
)
Nk ≤ αx and f −4C ≥ η2.
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Case (v): x = 0. This case is characterized by
αx < 0 and (33a)
or
αx
N
≤ f −4C and (33b)
or αx −Nk ≤ 0 and (33c)
⇐⇒ αx < 0
or αx ≥ 0 and αx +N(4C − f) ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ αx + (f −4C) < (N + 1)k
or αx ≥ 0 and αx −Nk ≤ 0 and (N + 1)k ≤ αx + (f −4C).
The equivalence is due to the following facts. First, (33b) and αx < 0 =⇒ αx +N(4C − f) < 0.
Second, (33c) and αx < 0 =⇒ αx −Nk < 0.
A.4 Forward Market Equilibrium
Theorem 1. Suppose αx > 0. Let Q ⊆ R × R+ denote the set of all symmetric Nash equilibria, i.e.,
(f, x) ∈ Q if (f1, x1) is a Nash equilibrium of the forward market. Let:
Q1 :=
{
(f, x) ∈ R× R+
∣∣∣∣∣ x = 1M+1αxf < 4C − 1M+1αx
}
,
Q2 :=
{
(f, x) ∈ R× R+
∣∣∣∣∣ x =
1
M (αx − (4C − f))
max
(
0,4C − αxM+1
)
≤ f ≤ 4C + min
(
− αxMN+M+1 , η4
) } ,
Q3 :=
{
(f, x) ∈ R× R+
∣∣∣∣∣ x = N+1N2+MN+M+1
(
αx +N
24C)
f = N−1
N2+MN+M+1
(αx − (MN +M + 1)4C)
}
,
Q4 :=
(f, x) ∈ R× R+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x = 1M+1 (αx −Nk)
f ≥ 4C +
η1, if Nk < αx ≤
(
1 + (M+1)
√
N+1
(
√
N+1−1)2
)
Nk,
η2, if
(
1 + (M+1)
√
N+1
(
√
N+1−1)2
)
Nk < αx.
 .
where η1, η2, η4 are as defined in Proposition 4. Then,
Q =
(f, x) ∈ R× R+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(f, x) ∈ Q1 if αx ≤ (M + 1)4C,
or (f, x) ∈ Q2 if αx ≤ min ((MN +M + 1)4C, ζ1) ,
or (f, x) ∈ Q3 if (MN +M + 1)4C < αx ≤ ζ2,
or (f, x) ∈ Q4 if (M + 1)(4C + k) +Nk ≤ αx.
 ,
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where
ζ1 = MNk + (M + 1)4C + 2M
√
Nk4C, (46)
ζ2 = (MN +M + 1)4C + N
2 +NM +M + 1
N(N + 1) + 2(1−√N + 1)
(
Nk − (√N + 1− 1)24C
)
(47)
Moreover, for each (f, x) ∈ Q,
yj(f1, x1) = 0 ⇐⇒ (f, x) ∈ Q1 ∪Q2,
0 < yj(f1, x1) < k ⇐⇒ (f, x) ∈ Q3,
yj(f1, x1) = k ⇐⇒ (f, x) ∈ Q4.
Proof. Proof. The symmetric equilibria are given by the intersection of the follower and leader reac-
tions obtained in Propositions 3 and 4. We divide the analyses into three separate cases depending
on the value of the follower productions yj(f1, x1).
Case (i): yj(f1, x1) = 0. Using Propositions 3 and 4, we infer that (f, x) is a symmetric equilib-
rium with yj(f1, x1) = 0 if and only if
f ≤ − (αx −4C −Mx) , (48a)
0 ≥ αx −4C −Mx, (48b)
x =

1
M+1 [αx]
∞
0 , if f −4C < − αxM+1 ,
1
M (αx −4C + f) , if − αxM+1 ≤ f −4C ≤ min
(
− αxMN+M+1 , η4
)
.
(48c)
Suppose x = 1M+1 [αx]
∞
0 . Since αx > 0, we infer that x =
1
M+1αx. Substituting into (48a)
and (48b) yields
(48a) ⇐⇒ f < 4C − αx
M + 1
,
(48b) ⇐⇒ αx ≤ (M + 1)4C.
The above inequalities, together with (48c), imply that (f, x) satisfies (48) with x = 1M+1αx, if and
only if (f, x) ∈ Q1 and αx ≤ (M + 1)4C.
Suppose x = 1M (αx −4C + f). Substituting into (48a) and (48b) yields
(48a) ⇐⇒ f ≤ f ⇐⇒ True,
(48b) ⇐⇒ f ≥ 0.
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Therefore, there exists (f, x) that satisfies (48) with x = 1M (αx −4C + f) if and only if[
max
(
0,4C − αx
M + 1
)
,4C + min
(
− αx
MN +M + 1
, η4
)]
6= ∅
⇐⇒ 0 ≤ 4C + min
(
− αx
MN +M + 1
, η4
)
⇐⇒ αx ≤ (MN +M + 1)4C and 0 ≤ 4C + η4
⇐⇒ αx ≤ (MN +M + 1)4C and αx ≤ ζ1.
Therefore, (f, x) satisfies (48) with x = 1M (αx −4C + f), if and only if (f, x) ∈ Q2 and αx ≤
min ((MN +M + 1)4C, ζ1).
Case (ii): 0 ≤ yj(f1, x1) ≤ k. Using Propositions 3 and 4, we infer that (f, x) is a symmetric
equilibrium if and only if
f =
N − 1
N2 + 1
(αx −4C −Mx) , (49a)
0 ≤ αx −4C −Mx ≤ ξ1, (49b)
x =
1
M + 1
[αx +N(4C − f)]∞0 , (49c)
− αx
MN +M + 1
< f −4C ≤ max (k − (αx −Nk), η3) . (49d)
We show that x > 0. Suppose otherwise. Substituting into (49a) implies that f = N−1
N2+1
(αx −4C).
Substituting further into (49c) yields
αx +N
(
4C − N − 1
N2 + 1
(αx −4C)
)
≤ 0 ⇐⇒ αx +N4C < 0,
which is a contradiction since αx > 0, 4C ≥ 0, and N ≥ 2. Therefore, we assume that x > 0.
Solving (49a) and (49c) gives
f =
N − 1
N2 +MN +M + 1
(αx − (MN +M + 1)4C) ,
x =
N + 1
N2 +MN +M + 1
(
αx +N
24C) .
Substituting for x yields
(49b) ⇐⇒ (MN +M + 1)4C ≤ αx ≤ (MN +M + 1)4C + (N
2 +MN +M + 1)(N − 1)
N2 − 2√N + 1 k.
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Substituting for f yields
(49d) ⇐⇒ (MN +M + 1)4C < αx and αx ≤

N(M+1)
M+N 4C +
(
N + M+1M+N
)
k, if αx ≤ Nk,
ζ2, if αx > Nk,
⇐⇒ (MN +M + 1)4C < αx and αx ≤
Nk, if αx ≤ Nk,ζ2, if αx > Nk,
⇐⇒ (MN +M + 1)4C < αx ≤ ζ2.
The first equivalence is due to the fact that k − (αx − Nk) ≥ η3 ⇐⇒ αx ≤ Nk. The second
equivalence is due to the fact that4C ≥ 0 and k > 0. Next, using the fact that N ≥ 2,4C ≥ 0, k >
0, we obtain
ζ2 < (MN +M + 1)4C + (N
2 +MN +M + 1)(N − 1)
N2 − 2√N + 1 k,
from which it follows that (f, x) satisfies (49) if and only if (f, x) ∈ Q3 and (MN + M + 1)4C ≤
αx ≤ ζ2.
Case (iii): yj(f1, x1) = k. From Propositions 3 and 4, we infer that (f, x) is a symmetric
equilibrium if and only if
f ≥ −(αx −4C −Mx) + (N + 1)k, (50a)
(N + 1)k ≤ αx −4C −Mx, (50b)
x =
1
M + 1
[αx −Nk]∞0 , (50c)
f −4C ≥

k − (αx −Nk), if αx < Nk,
η2, if αx ≥
(
1 + (M+1)
√
N+1
(
√
N+1−1)2
)
Nk,
η1, otherwise.
(50d)
We divide the analyses into three cases depending on the value of αx.
Suppose 0 < αx ≤ Nk. Then, (50c) implies x = 0. However, substituting into (50b) implies
that αx−Nk ≥ k+4C > 0 which is a contradiction. Therefore, there does not exist an equilibrium
such that 0 < αx ≤ Nk.
Suppose Nk < αx ≤
(
1 + (M+1)
√
N+1
(
√
N+1−1)2
)
Nk. Then, (50c) implies x = 1M+1 (αx −Nk). Substi-
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tuting for x yields
(50a) ⇐⇒ f ≥ 4C − 1
M + 1
(αx −Nk) + k,
(50b) ⇐⇒ 4C − 1
M + 1
(αx −Nk) + k ≤ 0.
From (50d), we infer that f ≥ 4C + η1. Since N ≥ 2 =⇒ η1 ≥ k − αx−NkM+1 , it follows that the
symmetric equilibria are characterized by
x =
1
M + 1
(αx −Nk) and f ≥ 4C + η1 and 4C − 1
M + 1
(αx −Nk) + k ≤ 0. (51)
Suppose
(
1 + (M+1)
√
N+1
(
√
N+1−1)2
)
Nk < αx. Then, we again have
(50a) ⇐⇒ f ≥ 4C − 1
M + 1
(αx −Nk) + k,
(50b) ⇐⇒ 4C − 1
M + 1
(αx −Nk) + k ≤ 0.
From (50d), we infer that f ≥ 4C + η2. Since N ≥ 2 =⇒ η2 ≥ k − αx−NkM+1 , it follows that the
symmetric equilibria are characterized by
x =
1
M + 1
(αx −Nk) and f ≥ 4C + η2 and 4C − 1
M + 1
(αx −Nk) + k ≤ 0. (52)
By combining the characterizations in (51) and (52), we infer that (f, x) satisfies (50) if and
only if (f, x) ∈ Q4 and (M + 1)(4C + k) +Nk ≤ αx.
A.5 Stackelberg Equilibrium
Theorem 2. Suppose followers’ forward positions f = 0. Let X ⊆ R+ denote the set of symmetric
leader reactions, i.e., for each x ∈ X and i ∈M ,
ψi(x;x1,0) ≥ ψi(x¯;x1,0), ∀x¯ ∈ R+.
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Let:
x1 =
1
M + 1
[αx]
∞
0 ,
x2 =
1
M
(αx −4C) ,
x3 =
1
M + 1
[αx +N4C]∞0 ,
x4 =
1
M + 1
[αx −Nk]∞0 .
Then,
X =

x ∈ R+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x = x1 if αx < (M + 1)4C,
or x = x2 if (M + 1)4C ≤ αx ≤ min ((MN +M + 1)4C, ζ1) ,
or x = x3 if (MN +M + 1)4C < αx ≤ ζ2,
or x = x4 if αx ≥
Nk +
N(M+1)
2(
√
N+1−1)(4C + k), if (
√
N + 1− 1)24C < Nk,
Nk + (M + 1)
(4C +√Nk4C) , otherwise.

.
where
ζ1 := MNk + (M + 1)4C + 2M
√
Nk4C,
ζ2 := (MN +M + 1)4C + (M + 1)
√
N + 1
2(
√
N + 1− 1)
(
Nk −
(√
N + 1− 1
)24C) .
Moreover, for each x ∈ X,
yj(0, x1) = 0 ⇐⇒ x = x1 or x2,
0 < yj(0, x1) < k ⇐⇒ x = x3,
yj(0, x1) = k ⇐⇒ x = x4.
Proof. Proof. The result is obtained by substituting f = 0 into Proposition 4 and simplifying the
inequalities in X. For the case of x = x1, we have
f −4C < − αx
M + 1
⇐⇒ αx < (M + 1)4C.
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For the case of x = x2, we have
− αx
M + 1
≤ f −4C ≤ min
(
− αx
MN +M + 1
, η4
)
⇐⇒ − αx
M + 1
≤ −4C and −4C ≤ − αx
MN +M + 1
and −4C ≤ η4
⇐⇒ (M + 1)4C ≤ αx and αx ≤ (MN +M + 1)4C and αx ≤ ζ1
⇐⇒ (M + 1)4C ≤ αx ≤ min ((MN +M + 1)4C, ζ1) ,
where the second equivalence is due to the fact that −4C ≤ η4 ⇐⇒ αx ≤ ζ1. For the case of
x = x3, we have
− αx
MN +M + 1
< f −4C ≤ max (η3, k − (αx −Nk))
⇐⇒ − αx
MN +M + 1
< −4C ≤
k − (αx −Nk), if αx ≤ Nk,η3, if αx > Nk,
⇐⇒ (MN +M + 1)4C < αx ≤
Nk, if αx ≤ Nk,ζ2, if αx > Nk,
⇐⇒ (MN +M + 1)4C < αx ≤ ζ2.
The first equivalence is due to the fact that k − (αx − Nk) ≥ η3 ⇐⇒ αx ≤ Nk. The second
equivalence is due to the fact that 4C ≥ 0 and k > 0. For the case of x = x4, we have
f −4C ≥

k − (αx −Nk), if αx < Nk,
η2, if αx ≥
(
1 + (M+1)
√
N+1
(
√
N+1−1)2
)
Nk,
η1, otherwise.
Suppose αx < Nk. Then, the above inequality implies that −4C ≥ k − (αx − Nk) =⇒ αx ≥
4C + (N + 1)k > Nk, which is a contradiction. Henceforth, we assume that αx ≥ Nk, and obtain
−4C ≥
η2, if αx ≥
(
1 + (M+1)
√
N+1
(
√
N+1−1)2
)
Nk,
η1, if Nk ≤ αx <
(
1 + (M+1)
√
N+1
(
√
N+1−1)2
)
Nk,
⇐⇒ αx ≥
Nk + (M + 1)
(4C +√Nk4C) , if αx ≥ (1 + (M+1)√N+1(√N+1−1)2 )Nk,
Nk + N(M+1)
2(
√
N+1−1)(4C + k), if Nk ≤ αx <
(
1 + (M+1)
√
N+1
(
√
N+1−1)2
)
Nk,
⇐⇒ αx ≥
Nk +
N(M+1)
2(
√
N+1−1)(4C + k), if (
√
N + 1− 1)24C < Nk,
Nk + (M + 1)
(4C +√Nk4C) , otherwise.
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The last equivalence is due to the fact that N(M+1)
2(
√
N+1−1)(4C + k) <
(M+1)
√
N+1
(
√
N+1−1)2 Nk ⇐⇒ (
√
N + 1−
1)24C < Nk.
B Proofs of Structural Results
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
From Proposition 3, note that 0 < yj(f1, x1) < k if and only if f = N−1N2+1 (αx −4C −Mx).
Substituting into the follower productions from Proposition 2 gives
yj(f1, x1) =
N
N2 + 1
ξ,
which is strictly increasing in ξ. Since ξ ≤ (N2+1)(N−1)
N2−2√N+1 k, we obtain
y¯ =
(
1− N − 2
√
N + 1
N2 − 2√N + 1
)
k
≥
(
1− N + 1
N2 − 2√N
)
k
≥
(
1− 1
N
N + 1
N
N2
N2 − 2√N
)
k,
which gives the first claim.
Next, from Proposition 3,
¯
ξ and ξ¯ are given by
¯
ξ = (N + 1)k,
ξ¯ =
(N2 + 1)(N − 1)
N2 − 2√N + 1 k,
from which we obtain
¯
ξ − ξ¯
¯
ξ
=
2(N2 −N√N −√N + 1)
(N2 − 2√N + 1)(N + 1)
≤ 2(N
2 + 1)
N(N2 − 2√N)
=
2
N
N2 + 1
N2
N2
N2 − 2√N ,
which gives the rest of the second claim.
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
From Proposition 4,
¯
f and f¯ are given by
¯
f = 4C − αx
M + 1
,
f¯ = 4C + min
(
− αx
MN +M + 1
, η4
)
.
The first claim follows from Proposition 4. Next,
f¯ −
¯
f =
αx
M + 1
+ min
(
− αx
MN +M + 1
, η4
)
≤ αx
M + 1
− αx
MN +M + 1
=
MNαx
(M + 1)(MN +M + 1)
≤ MNαx
M2(N + 1)
=
αx
M
N
N + 1
,
which gives the second claim.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3
From Proposition 4, note that 0 < yj(f1, x1) < k =⇒ x = x3. Substituting into the follower
productions from Proposition 2 gives
yj(f1, x1) =
[
1
N + 1
(
αx + (f −4C)− M
M + 1
(αx +N(4C − f))
)]k
0
,
which is strictly increasing in f . Note that x = x3 is a reaction if and only if
− αx
MN +M + 1
< f −4C ≤ max (η3, k − (αx −Nk)) ⇐⇒ − αx
MN +M + 1
< f −4C ≤ η3,
where we used the fact that αx > Nk =⇒ η3 ≥ k − (αx −Nk). Since
αx ≤ Nk
(
1 +
(M + 1)
√
N + 1
(
√
N + 1− 1)2 +
(M − 1)√N + 1√
N + 1− 1
)
=⇒ − αx
NM +M + 1
≤ η3,
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we infer the case for y¯ = 0. Otherwise, substituting for η3 gives
y¯ = yj ((4C + η3)1, x31)
= k +
αx −Nk
N + 1
1
M + 1
(
2(M + 1)(N + 1)− (M + 1)(N + 2)√N + 1
N(2 + (M − 1)√N + 1
)
≥ k − αx −Nk
N
(
N + 2
(N + 1)(M − 1)
)
,
from which we obtain the first claim. From Proposition 4, we infer that f¯ = η3 and
¯
f = η1 when
αx ≤ Nk
(
1 + (M+1)
√
N+1
(
√
N+1−1)2
)
. Therefore, we obtain
f¯ −
¯
f =
αx −Nk
N
(
2(
√
N + 1− 1
)(2 + (M − 1)√N + 1− (M + 1)
(M + 1)(2 + (M − 1)√N + 1
)
≤ 2
(
αx −Nk
N
)(√
N + 1− 1
M − 1
)
≤ αx −Nk
M
√
N
2
(√
N + 1√
N
M
M − 1
)
,
which gives the second claim.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 4
From Theorem 1, note that 0 < yj(f1, x1) < k =⇒ (f, x) ∈ Q3. Substituting into the follower
productions from Proposition 2 gives
yj(f1, x1) =
N
N2 +NM +M + 1
αx,
which is strictly increasing in αx. Since αx ≤ ζ2, it follows that
y¯ =
N
N2 +NM +M + 1
ζ2
=
(
1− N + 2− 2
√
N + 1
N2 +N + 2− 2√N + 1
)
k
≥
(
1− N
N2 +N
)
k
=
(
1− 1
N
N
N + 1
)
k,
from which we obtain the first claim.
Next, from Theorem 1, we infer that α¯x = ζ2 and
¯
α = (M + N + 1)k. It is easy to show that
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ζ2 < (M +N + 1)k ⇐⇒ M < N
√
N + 1− 1. Moreover,
(M +N + 1)k − ζ2 = 2
N2 + (
√
N + 1− 1)2
(
(N2 +N +M + 1)− (M +N + 1)√N + 1
)
k.
Therefore, if
¯
αx ≤ α¯x, then
¯
αx − α¯x
¯
αx
=
2
N2 + (
√
N + 1− 1)2
(
1 +
N2
M +N + 1
−√N + 1
)
≤ 2N
N2 + (
√
N + 1− 1)2
≤ 2N
N2
,
from which we obtain the first part of the second claim. If
¯
αx ≥ α¯x, then
α¯x −
¯
αx
¯
αx
=
2
N2 + (
√
N + 1− 1)2
(√
N + 1− 1− N
2
M +N + 1
)
≤ 2
N2 + (
√
N + 1− 1)2
(√
N + 1
)
≤ 2
N2
√
N + 2
≤ 2
N
√
N
√
N + 2
N
,
from which we obtain the rest of the second claim.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 6
From Theorem 1, note that 0 < yj(f1, x1) < k ⇐⇒ (f, x) ∈ Q3. Substituting into the follower
productions from Proposition 2 gives
yj(f1, x1) =
N
N2 +MN +M + 1
(αx − (MN +M + 1)4C) ,
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which is strictly increasing in αx. Since αx ≤ ζ2, it follows that
y¯ =
N
N2 +MN +M + 1
(ζ2 − (MN +M + 1)4C)
=
N2
N2 + (
√
N + 1− 1)2
(
k − (
√
N + 1− 1)2
N
4C
)
≥
(
1− N + 2− 2
√
N + 1
N2
)(
k − (
√
N + 1− 1)2
N
4C
)
≥
(
1− 1
N
)(
k − (
√
N + 1− 1)2
N
4C
)
,
from which we obtain the first claim.
Next, from Theorem 1, we infer that if (
√
N + 1 − 1)24C < Nk, then α¯x = ζ2 and
¯
αx =
(M +N + 1)k, and it is straightforward to show that ζ2 < (M +N + 1)k if and only if the first case
in (3) holds. Otherwise, then α¯x = ζ1 and
¯
αx = (M + N + 1)k, and it is straightforward to show
that ζ1 < (M +N + 1)k if and only if the second case in (3) holds.
B.6 Proof of Lemma 7
From Theorem 2, note that 0 < yj(0, x1) < k ⇐⇒ x = x3. Substituting into the follower
productions from Proposition 2 gives
yj(0, x1) =
1
(N + 1)(M + 1)
(αx − (MN +M + 1)4C) ,
which is strictly increasing in αx. Since αx ≤ ζ2, it follows that
y¯ =
1
(N + 1)(M + 1)
(ζ2 − (MN +M + 1)4C)
=
(
1 +
1√
N + 1
)
k
2
,
from which we obtain the first claim.
Next, from Theorem 2, we infer that α¯x = ζ2 and
¯
αx = Nk +
N(M+1)
2(
√
N+1−1)(4C + k). It is
straightforward to show that α¯x ≥
¯
αx.
B.7 Proof of Lemma 9
From Theorem 2, note that 0 < yj(0, x1) < k ⇐⇒ x = x3. Substituting into the follower
productions from Proposition 2 gives
yj(0, x1) =
1
(N + 1)(M + 1)
(αx − (MN +M + 1)4C) ,
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which is strictly increasing in αx. Since αx ≤ ζ2, it follows that
y¯ =
1
(N + 1)(M + 1)
(ζ2 − (MN +M + 1)4C)
=
(
1 +
1√
N + 1
)
1
2
(
k − (
√
N + 1− 1)2
N
4C
)
,
from which we obtain the first claim.
Next, from Theorem 2, we infer that, if (
√
N + 1 − 1)24C < Nk, then α¯x = ζ2 and
¯
αx =
Nk+ N(M+1)
2(
√
N+1−1)(4C + k), and it is straightforward to show that α¯x ≥ ¯αx. Otherwise, then α¯x = ζ1
and
¯
αx = Nk + (M + 1)(4C +
√
Nk4C), and it is straightforward to show that α¯x ≥
¯
αx.
B.8 Proof of Lemma 10
The proof proceeds in three steps. In step 1, we compute an equilibria with the smallest (resp.
largest) market production in the forward (resp. Stackelberg) market. In step 2, we compute
an equilibria with the smallest (resp. largest) social welfare in the forward (resp. Stackelberg)
market. In step 3, we show that the worst case ratios of productions and efficiencies are both
strictly increasing in αx. The bounds in the lemma are obtained by evaluating those ratios at
αx = α¯x.
Step 1: We compute an equilibria with the smallest (resp. largest) market production in the
forward (resp. Stackelberg) market. First, we tackle the forward market. Substituting 4C = 0
into Theorem 1, we infer that (f, x) ∈ Q if and only if (f, x) ∈ Q3 or (f, x) ∈ Q4. By substituting
into Theorem 2, and using the fact that yj(f1, x1) = 0 for all (f, x) ∈ Q4, we obtain the following
market productions:
Mx+Nyj(f1, x1) =
 1N2+MN+M+1
(
N2 +MN +M
)
αx, if (f, x) ∈ Q3,
1
M+1 (Mαx +Nk) , if (f, x) ∈ Q4.
Note that
1
M + 1
[Mαx +Nk]
=
1
N2 +MN +M + 1
[
(N2 +MN +M)αx +
−N2 −MN
M + 1
αx +
N(N2 +MN +M + 1)
M + 1
k
]
≤ 1
N2 +MN +M + 1
[
(N2 +MN +M)αx +
N(M + 1)(1−N −M)
M + 1
k
]
≤ 1
N2 +MN +M + 1
(
N2 +MN +M
)
αx,
where the first inequality is due to the fact that αx ≥
¯
αx and the second inequality is due to the
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fact that M ≥ 1, N ≥ 2, and k > 0. Therefore, we infer that the smallest equilibrium production in
the forward market is given by
yF = k,
xF =
1
M + 1
(αx −Nk).
Next, we tackle the Stackelberg market. Substituting 4C = 0 into Theorem 2, we infer that
(0, xs) ∈ X(0) if and only if xs = x3 or xs = x4. Suppse
αx < Nk +
N(M + 1)
2(
√
N + 1− 1)k. (53)
Then, from Theorem 2, we conclude that xs = x3 is the only Stackelberg equilibrium, and hence
it is also the equilibrium with the largest market production. Suppose, instead, that (53) does not
hold. By substituting into Proposition 2, and using the fact that yj(0, x41) = 0, we obtain the
following market productions:
Mxs +Nyj(0, xs1) =
 MN+M+N(M+1)(N+1)αx, if xs = x3,1
M+1 (Mαx +Nk) , if xs = x4.
Note that
MN +M +N
(M + 1)(N + 1)
αx
=
1
M + 1
[
Mαx +
N
N + 1
αx
]
≥ 1
M + 1
[
Mαx +
N
N + 1
(
N +
N(M + 1)
2(
√
N + 1− 1)
)
k
]
≥ 1
M + 1
[
Mαx +
N
N + 1
(N + 1) k
]
=
1
N + 1
[Mαx +Nk] ,
where the first inequality is due to the fact that (53) does not hold and the second inequality is due
to the fact that M ≥ 1 and N ≥ 2. Therefore, we infer that the largest equilibrium production in
the Stackelberg market is given by
yS =
1
N + 1
(αx −Mxs) ,
xS =
1
M + 1
αx.
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Step 2: We compute the equilibria with the smallest (resp. largest) social welfare in the forward
(resp. Stackelberg) market. Substituting the demand function into the social welfare gives
SW(y, x) = β
(
αx (Mx+Ny)−4CNy − 1
2
(Mx+Ny)2
)
= β
(
αx (Mx+Ny)− 1
2
(Mx+Ny)2
)
,
where the second equality is obtained by substituting 4C = 0. Given any two equilibrium produc-
tions (y, x) and (y′, x′), we have
SW(y, x) ≥ SW(y′, x′)
⇐⇒ αx(Mx+Ny)− 1
2
(Mx+Ny)2 ≥ αx(Mx′ +Ny′)− 1
2
(Mx′ +Ny′)2
⇐⇒ 1
2
(
(Mx+Ny)− (Mx′ +Ny′)) (αx − (Mx+Ny) + αx − (Mx′ +Ny′)) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ 1
2
(
(Mx+Ny)− (Mx′ +Ny′))( 1
β
(P (Mx+Ny)− C) + 1
β
(
P (Mx′ +Ny′)− C)) ≥ 0
⇐⇒Mx+Ny ≥Mx′ +Ny′,
where the last equivalence follows from the fact that, since (y, x) and (y′, x′) are equilibrium pro-
ductions, the profit margins P (Mx + Ny) − C > 0 and P (Mx′ + Ny′) − C > 0. Therefore, the
equilibria with the smallest (resp. largest) social welfare in the forward (resp. Stackelberg) market
are those with the smallest (resp. largest) market productions, which were obtained in step 1.
Step 3: We show that the worst-case ratios of productions and social welfares are strictly in-
creasing in αx. From step 1, the ratio of productions is bounded from above by
rP :=
MxS +NyS
MxF +NyF
.
Taking derivatives gives
∂rP
∂αx
=
(MxF +NyF )
(
M ∂xS∂αx +N
∂yS
∂αx
)
− (MxS +NyS)
(
M ∂xF∂αx +N
∂yF
∂αx
)
(MxF +NyF )2
=
N(MN+M+N)k
(M+1)2(N+1)
(MxF +NyF )2
> 0.
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Next, the ratio of social welfares is bounded from above by
rW :=
SW(yS , xS)
SW(yF , xF )
.
Taking derivatives gives
∂rW
∂αx
=
SW(yF , xF )
∂SW(yS ,xS)
∂αx
− SW(yS , xS)∂SW(yF ,xF )∂αx
SW(yF , xF )2
=
β
2(M+1)4(N+1)2
(MN +M +N)(MN +M +N + 2)(αx −Nk)Nkαx
SW(yF , xF )2
> 0,
where the inequality is due to αx ≥
¯
αx > Nk. Therefore, rP and rW are both strictly increasing in
αx over [
¯
αx, α¯x]. By substituting αx = α¯x into rP and rW , we obtain the desired result.
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